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I am quite seriously proposing that we give legal rights to
forests, oceans, rivers and other so-called “natural objects” in
the environment - indeed, to the natural environment as a
whole.
As strange as such a notion may sound, it is neither fanciful nor
devoid of operational content. In fact, I do not think it would
be a misdescription of recent developments in the law to say
that we are already on the verge of assigning some such rights,
although we have not faced up to what we are doing in those
particular terms. We should do so now, and begin to explore
the implications such a notion would hold.1
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I. ENVIRONMENTAL PERSONHOOD
In 2021, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(“IPCC”) found that the global surface temperature increased faster
between 1970 and 2020 than during any other fifty-year period
over the last 2,000 years.2 Between 2011 and 2020, annual average
Arctic sea ice area reached its lowest level since at least 1850, and
global mean sea level has risen faster since 1900 than over any
preceding century in the last 3,000 years.3 The IPCC also found that
it is virtually certain that hot extremes have become more frequent
and intense across most land regions since the 1950s.4 In 2020, the
United Nations Secretary-General wrote that the climate
emergency demanded an urgent collective global response.5
Commentators have identified the conferral of legal
personality or rights on the environment, often referred to as
environmental personhood, as one legal avenue to improve
environmental outcomes.
At common law, legal persons are defined by reference to
their capability to exercise rights and owe duties.6 Legal persons
include natural and juristic persons.7 The civil law equivalent of the
juristic person is the moral person.8 Early twentieth century jurist
and judge of the Supreme Court of New Zealand, the Hon. Sir John
2. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS:
FULL REPORT 9-10 (2021).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 10-11.
5. UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORKS CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, United Nations
Climate
Change
Annual
Report
2020
6
(2020),
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/UNFCCC_Annual_Report_2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A6BL-F8YL] (last visited Oct. 7, 2021).
6. See Legal Person, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009); Alexandre Lillo, Is Water
Simply a Flow?: Exploring an Alternative Mindset for Recognizing Water as a Legal Person,
19.2 VT. J. ENV’T L., 164, 181 (2018) (citing Alexis Dyschkant, Legal Personhood: How We
Are Getting It Wrong, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 2075, 2079-80 (2015)); Erin O’Donnell,
Competition or Collaboration? Using Legal Persons to Manage Water for the Environment in
Australia and the United States, 34 ENV’T & PLANNING L.J. 503, 507 (2017).
7. Lillo, supra note 6, at 181.
8. Id. at 183.
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W. Salmond, conceived of the juristic person as an entity, whether
real or imaginary, to whom personality has been attributed by way
of fiction,9 such as a corporation or trust.10 In common and civil law
orthodoxy, natural entities are merely the objects of relations
between legal persons.11 Proponents of environmental
personhood propose that the environment should be made a
subject in its own right through recognition as a legal person or
being granted rights as if it were such a person.12
Concepts akin to environmental personhood are featured in
many systems of First Nations customary law.13 For example, Dr
Kura Paul-Burke and Dr Lesley Rameka describe the Māori
worldview as follows:
A Māori perspective of the natural world encapsulates a
holistic epistemological world view. Our ways of knowing,
being and doing are connected with Papatūānuku (earth
mother), Ranginui (sky father) and their many children,
including Tangaroa (oceans). All of whom act as guardians of
the natural world and its domains. As ira tangata (humans) our
role is that of kaitaiki (caretaker) and it is our obligation to
nurture and protect the physical and spiritual well-being of the
natural systems that surround and support us. Kaitiaki are
agents that perform the task of active guardianship. They are
charged with the responsibility to safeguard and manage
natural resources for present and future generations.14
9. Akshita Jha & Adrija Ghosh, Is Being a ‘Person’ Essential for the Environment to Hold
Rights?: Assessing the Legitimacy of Environmental Personhood and Alternative Approaches,
11 NUJS L. REV. 469, 474 (2018) (citing JOHN W. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 541 (4th ed.
1913)).
10. Lillo, supra note 6, at 182.
11. Cristy Clark et al., Can You Hear the Rivers Sing? Legal Personhood, Ontology, and
the Nitty-Gritty of Governance, 45 ECOLOGY L. Q. 787, 830-31 (2018).
12. Joshua C. Gellers, Earth System Law and the Legal Status of Non-Humans in the
Anthropocene, 7 EARTH SYS. GOVERNANCE 1, 2 (2021).
13. THE CYRUS R. VANCE CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, EARTH LAW CENTER &
INTERNATIONAL RIVERS, Rights of Rivers 13 (2019), https://3waryu2g9363hdvii1ci666pwpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/86/2020/09/Right-of-RiversReport-V3-Digital-compressed.pdf [https://perma.cc/RAT3-UD7B] (last visited Oct. 7,
2021) [hereinafter Rights of Rivers].
14. Dr. Kura Paul-Burke & Dr. Lesley Rameka, Kaitiakitanga - Active Guardianship,
Responsibilities And Relationships With The World: Towards A Bio-Cultural Future In Early
Childhood
Education
(2015),
https://researchcommons.waikato.ac.nz/bitstream/handle/10289/11216/Kaitiakitanga
%20-%20FINAL.pdf?sequence=11&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/2LYM-LNWG] (last
visited Oct. 7, 2021).
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Conversely, in Western jurisprudence the emergence of the
concept of environmental personhood can be traced to
Christopher Stone’s seminal 1972 essay “Should Trees Have
Standing?” in which the American professor argued that the
natural environment as a whole should be granted rights15 and be
empowered to institute legal proceedings in its own right through
a guardian entity.16 This would enable courts to take injury to the
environment into account and to award relief that would directly
benefit the environment.17
Stone emphasized that environmental personhood was not as
radical as it initially appeared, noting that the legal world is
populated by inanimate rights-holders: “trusts, corporations, joint
ventures . . . to mention just a few.”18 Stone further drew a parallel
between granting rights to nature and the history of the conferral
of rights on oppressed or minority groups in ways “theretofore, a
bit unthinkable.”19
The emergence of Earth jurisprudence has reinvigorated calls
to provide rights to nature. At a 2001 conference, Thomas Berry,
cultural historian, presented an influential set of principles for that
movement. These included that, “no living being nourishes itself.
Each component of the Earth community is immediately or
mediately dependent on every other member of the community for
the nourishment and assistance it needs for its own survival.”20
Another leading scholar of Earth jurisprudence, Cormac Cullinan,
later wrote that society must overcome the “falsehood . . . that we
humans are separate from our environment and that we can
flourish even as the health of the Earth deteriorates.”21
In the past two decades, several jurisdictions have executed
Stone’s vision and conferred rights on nature. In 2006, the first
environmental personhood regime was implemented in

15. Stone, supra note 1, at 456; see also Lillo, supra note 6, at 165.
16. Stone, supra note 1, at 467. Stone argues that unlike the liberal standing
approach, the guardianship approach would secure an effective voice for the environment
even where federal administrative action and public lands were not involved. A
representative approach would also allay concerns of a flood of un-meritorious claims.
17. Id. at 462.
18. Id. at 452.
19. Id. at 453.
20. David Takacs, We Are the River, 2 U. ILL. L. REV. 545, 556 (2021).
21. Id. at 557.
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Pennsylvania by way of a local government ordinance.22 In 2008,
the rights of nature were recognized in the Constitution of the
Republic of Ecuador.23 In 2010, Bolivia enacted laws recognizing
the rights of Mother Earth24 and the Universal Declaration of the
Rights of Mother Earth was adopted at the World People’s
Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth.25 In
2014, the International Rights of Nature Tribunal (“IRNT”) was
first convened in Ecuador by the Global Alliance for the Rights of
Nature.26 Since then, legislation has been introduced in New
Zealand (Aotearoa) granting legal personhood to the Te Urewera
protected area27 and the Whanganui River.28 New Zealand has also
entered into a Record of Understanding with Ngā Iwi o Taranaki
that confers legal personhood on Ngā Maunga, which includes Mt
Taranaki on the North Island.29 In September 2017, the Australian
State of Victoria enacted legislation creating the Birrarung Council
to act as the independent voice for the Yarra River, although the
river itself was not granted legal personhood.30 In 2019, Uganda
enacted legislation conferring rights on nature,31 and the Mexican
State of Colima amended its constitution to recognize such rights.32
Courts in several jurisdictions have also upheld the rights of
nature. In 2017, the High Court of Uttarakhand in India handed
22. Tamaqua Borough, Schuylkill County, Pa., Ordinance 612 (Sept. 19, 2006)
[hereinafter Tamaqua Borough Ordinance].
23. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR Oct. 20, 2008.
24. Law of the Rights of Mother Earth, Law 071 (2010) (Bol.).
25. World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth,
Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth, in GLOBAL ALLIANCE FOR THE RIGHTS OF
NATURE (Apr. 22, 2010).
26. Hannah White, Indigenous Peoples, the International Trend toward Legal
Personhood for Nature, and the United States, 43 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 129, 138-39 (2018).
27. Te Urewera Act 2014 (Act No. 51/2014) (N.Z.).
28. Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act, 2017 (Act No. 7/2017)
(N.Z.).
29. Deena Coster, Taranaki Maunga: Settlement Looms on Horizon, with Changes in
the Wind, STUFF (Dec. 12, 2020), https://www.stuff.co.nz/pou-tiaki/123597917/taranakimaunga-settlement-looms-on-horizon-with-changes-in-the-wind
[https://perma.cc/7GU8-72A4]; see also Record Of Understanding for Mount Taranaki,
Pouakai
and
the
Kaitake
Ranges
(Dec.
20,
2017),
https://www.govt.nz/assets/Documents/OTS/Taranaki-Maunga/Taranaki-Maunga-TeAnga-Putakerongo-Record-of-Understanding-20-December-2017.pdf.
30. Yarra River Protection (Wilip-gin Birrarung murron) Act (Vic), 2017 (Act No.
49/2017) (Austl).
31. National Environment Act, 2019 (Act No. 5/2019) (Uganda).
32. Rights of Rivers, supra note 13, at 42.
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down two decisions granting personhood to major rivers and the
ecosystems supporting them.33 Similar decisions exist in
Colombia34 and Bangladesh.35
These developments have prompted some scholars to
proclaim that a watershed moment for the rights of nature is
underway.36 However, the efficacy and impact of recognizing the
existence of such rights remain contestable37 due to a scarcity of
empirical evidence assessing the practical impact of conferring
rights on nature.38 Notwithstanding the nascent nature of these
rights, this article will seek to explore the question of whether
personhood can protect the environment.
This article is structured in four substantive parts. Section A
identifies the rationale underpinning environmental personhood
by analyzing the merits of various arguments in support of
conferring rights on nature. Section B evaluates the types of rights
of nature that have been entrenched and the corresponding
standing mechanisms. A consideration of the methods by which
rights of nature have been conferred, and the respective
advantages and limitations of each mechanism, is provided in
Section C. Finally, Section D provides a summary of curial decisions
upholding the rights of nature and a discussion on the role of
domestic courts in expanding rights of nature jurisprudence.
A.

The Rationale Behind Granting Legal Rights to Nature

Proponents of environmental personhood argue that granting
rights to nature may challenge flawed anthropocentric
environmental protection legislation and regulation, improve
environmental outcomes, and enhance the recognition of First

33. Salim v. State of Uttarakhand LNIND 2016 UTTAR 990 (India); see also Lalit
Miglani v. State of Uttarakhand 2016 UTTAR 885 (India).
34. Ctr. for Soc. Just. Stud. et al. v. Presidency of the Republic (Constitutional Court of
Colombia, T-622/16, 10 November 2016) (Colom.). The authors have relied on an English
translation of this case completed by Dignity Rights Project, Delaware Law School.
35. See Nishat Jute Mills, Ltd. v Hum. Rts. and Peace for Bangladesh (Supreme Court
of Bangladesh, No. 3039 of 2019, 17 February 2020) (Bangl.).
36. Takacs, supra note 20, at 548.
37. Dana Zartner, Watching Whanganui & the Lessons of Lake Erie: Effective
Realization of Rights of Nature Laws, 22 VT. J. ENV’T L. 1, 1 (2021); Takacs, supra note 20, at
601-02.
38. See Rights of Rivers, supra note 13, at 7.
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Nations concepts of stewardship. The merits of these arguments
are considered in this Part.
1. Challenging Anthropocentrism
While an increasing number of environmental protection laws
have been promulgated globally since the mid-twentieth century,
these have generally reinforced the notion that nature exists as an
object of possession or to provide recreational space for humans.39
Berry first labeled the perceived primacy of humans over all other
entities inhabiting the Earth system as “anthropocentrism.”40
According to Berry, anthropocentrism is the root cause of the
current environmental crisis.41 Lillo considers that disrupting the
anthropocentrism of traditional environmental law is the most
significant benefit of conferring rights on nature.42
The anthropocentric focus of environmental protection laws
remains commonplace. For example, in Australia, the Environment
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 is guided by
“principles of ecologically sustainable development” including
“inter-generational equity,” that is, the concept that “the present
generation should ensure that the health, diversity and
productivity of the environment is maintained or enhanced for the
benefit of future generations.”43
Stone considered that the adoption of a rights discourse was
essential to ensure the protection of the environment because until
an entity received rights, humans failed to see it as anything but a
“thing” for exploitation.44 He also considered that the language of
rights was a powerful tool because when a right is conceptualized
it changes the legal language—and therefore subtly shifts the
jurisprudence—available to advocates. This encourages the
development of a viable body of law, thereby changing how the
39. Kaitlin Sheber, Legal Rights for Nature: How the Idea of Recognising Nature as a
Legal Entity Can Spread and Make a Difference Globally, 26 HASTINGS ENV’T L.J. 147, 151
(2020).
40. Matija Zgur, All the Earth’s Legal Children: Some Sceptical Comments About
Nature’s Legal Personhood 2 DIRITTO & QUESTIONI PUBBLICHE 87, 90 (2020) (citing THOMAS
BERRY, THE GREAT WORK. OUR WAY INTO THE FUTURE (1999)).
41. Id.
42. Lillo, supra note 6, at 168.
43. Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act, 1999 (Cth) (Act No.
91/1999), § 3A(c) (Austl.).
44. Stone, supra note 1, at 455.
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new rights-holder is viewed.45 In other words, rights offer an
enduring value to advocacy as normative jurisprudential
constructs.46
Notwithstanding that the philosophy of environmental
personhood
is
deeply
concerned
with
challenging
anthropocentrism, the extent to which rights of nature
frameworks achieve this goal varies. For example, in Colombia,
curial decisions conferring rights on nature have largely
emphasized the ability of ecosystems to support human
communities now and into the future, rather than the value of
those ecosystems in and of themselves.47
2. The Enhancement of Environmental Outcomes
Another rationale that underpins environmental personhood
is to enhance environmental outcomes. Present state and non-state
measures to combat climate change are inadequate to meet the
challenges posed by the climate emergency.48 A “silver lining” of
the Anthropocene age may be its facilitation of innovative legal
models such as environmental personhood.49 Environmental law
scholars Louis J. Kotzé and Paola Villavicencio Calzadilla argue that
to achieve enhanced environmental outcomes, “lawyers,
politicians and academics, among many other role players” need to
be open to “alternative, potentially progressive, and possibly more
effective juridical framings that focus on preserving Earth system
integrity.”50
45. Stone, supra note 1, at 488-89. See also Hope M. Babcock, A Brook With Legal
Rights: The Rights of Nature in Court, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 4 (2016).
46. Paola Villavicencio Calzadilla & Louis J. Kotzé, Somewhere Between Rhetoric and
Reality: Environmental Constitutionalism and the Rights of Nature in Ecuador, 6 TRANSNAT’L
ENV’T L. 401, 407 (2017) [hereinafter Calzadilla & Kotzé, Somewhere Between Rhetoric and
Reality]; see also Meg Good, The River as a Legal Person: Evaluating Nature Rights-Based
Approaches to Environmental Protection in Australia, 1 NAT’L ENV’T L. REV. 34, 35 (2013);
Stefan Knauß, Conceptualizing Human Stewardship in the Anthropocene: The Rights of
Nature in Ecuador, New Zealand and India, 31 J. AGRIC. ENV’T ETHICS 703, 705 (2018).
47. Rights of Rivers, supra note 13, at 32.
48. United Nations Environment Programme and Sabin Center for Climate Change
Law, Global Climate Litigation Report: 2020 Status Review, U.N. Doc. DEL/2333/NA 6
(2020); see also Hailey A. Walley, Two Arguments for Extending Legal Personhood to
Nature 1 (May 2019) (Honors thesis, University of Mississippi).
49. Gellers, supra note 12, at 1.
50. Paola Villavicencio Calzadilla & Louis J. Kotzé, Living in Harmony with Nature? A
Critical Appraisal of the Rights of Mother Earth in Bolivia 7 TRANSNAT’L ENV’T L. 397, 424
(2018) [hereinafter Calzadilla & Kotzé, Living in Harmony].
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Environmental protection legislation has traditionally
focused on bringing violators into compliance with the law rather
than restoring contaminated ecosystems.51 In 1972 Stone
remarked upon the inadequacy of the remedies available in
traditional environmental protection litigation:
[E]ven if a plaintiff riparian wins a water pollution suit for
damages, no money goes to the stream itself to repair its
damages . . . even if the jurisdiction issues an injunction . . .
there is nothing to stop the plaintiffs from selling out the
stream, i.e. agreeing to dissolve or not enforce the injunction
at some price.52

Moreover, plaintiffs have historically struggled to obtain
adequate remedies in environmental protection litigation.53 For
example, in the United States, many such actions are never tried on
their merits, immediately failing on grounds of non-justiciability or
lack of standing.54 Kaitlin Sheber, environmental law attorney,
states that granting rights to nature would better protect the
environment because this would allow more environmental
protection lawsuits to be brought, fewer cases would “fall through
the cracks” due to lack of standing, and, if an action was successful,
any damages awarded would redress the injury to the
environment, rather than enrich a human or corporate plaintiff.55
At the very least, granting rights to nature assists in obtaining a
favorable decision from a court.56
Dutch ecologists recently considered the potential efficacy of
granting personhood to rivers.57 They concluded that the transfer
of legal personhood to a river would not necessarily improve its
health58 and found that environmental personhood has the
potential to address the significance of healthy rivers now and for
future generations, "but must be accompanied by enforceable
rules, laid down in legislation, on priority setting and the role of the
51. Nicholas Bilof, The Right to Flourish, Regenerate, and Evolve: Towards Juridicial
Personhood for an Ecosystem 10 GOLDEN GATE U. ENV’T L.J. 111, 120 (2018).
52. Stone, supra note 1, at 462.
53. Bilof, supra note 51, at 120.
54. Id.
55. Sheber, supra note 39, at 165-66.
56. Id.
57. See Susanne Wuijts et al., An Ecological Perspective on a River’s Rights: A Recipe
for More Effective Water Quality Governance?, 44 WATER INT’L 647 (2019).
58. Id. at 662-63.
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custodian across multi-jurisdictional hydrological scales and
institutional levels."59
Blake opines that the efficacy of nature’s rights depends on
the scale of injury that is required to invoke these rights. For
example, if courts only recognize substantial damage as an injury
to nature, these rights may not be very effective. Additionally, she
considers that environmental personhood will only result in
improved environmental outcomes if a guardian body is appointed
to rigorously oversee the health of the ecosystem and empowered
to bring proceedings to protect that ecosystem.60 Conversely,
Darpö considers that environmental personhood is likely to face
the same challenges encountered by traditional environmental
protection frameworks, including the deferral to economic growth,
weak enforcement, and a lack of funding.61
These observations are particularly apt with respect to
countries with high rates of poverty where the extraction of
natural resources is the easiest and most lucrative way to ensure
economic development.62 For example, environmental
exploitation persists in Ecuador,63 despite a wave of successful
litigation based on the country’s constitutional rights of nature.
Esperanza Martínez, the founder of the environmental
organization Acción Ecológica, recently stated, “[A]lthough
[Ecuador] has improved regarding the rights of nature, and
environmental discussions have permeated government entities,
the intention to accelerate extraction is entirely present.”64 As of
2014, approximately thirty-nine percent of Ecuador’s greenhouse
gas emissions were derived from deforestation and other land use
59. Id. at 664.
60. Emilie Blake, Are Water Body Personhood Rights the Future of Water Management
in the United States, 47 TEX. ENV’T L.J. 197, 208 (2017).
61. Jan Darpö, Can Nature Get it Right? A Study on Rights of Nature in the European
Context, EUR. PARLIAMENT POL’Y DEP’T FOR CITIZENS’ RTS. & CONST. AFF. DIRECTORATE-GENERAL
FOR
INTERNAL
POLICIES
60
(2021),
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/689328/IPOL_STU(202
1)689328_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/WLN4-NY2N] (last visited Oct. 7, 2021).
62. Calzadilla & Kotzé, Living in Harmony, supra note 50, at 400.
63. Rickard Lalander, Rights of Nature and the Indigenous Peoples in Bolivia and
Ecuador 3 IBEROAM. J. DEV. STUD. 148, 150-51 (2014).
64. Antonio José Paz Cardona, For Ecuador, a Litany of Environmental Challenges
Awaits in 2020, MONGABAY (Romina Castagnino & Sarah Engel trans., Feb. 5, 2020),
https://news.mongabay.com/2020/02/for-ecuador-a-litany-of-environmentalchallenges-awaits-in-2020/ [https://perma.cc/H9HG-AAKL].

326

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:2

practices, largely for the purpose of oil extraction.65 In 2020,
Ecuador had the highest annual deforestation rate of any country
in the western hemisphere for its size.66
Similarly, Bolivia has legislated the rights of nature but
continues to expand its extractive industry.67 For example,
Supreme Decree 2366, enacted in May 2015, legalized exploratory
drilling in more than sixty of Bolivia’s protected areas and twentytwo of its national parks.68 In 2019 Bolivia lost 50,000m2 of forest
in an unusually destructive fire season and experts say that the
unique scale of destruction resulted from agricultural expansion
driven by the government’s pro-development agenda.69 These
environmental outcomes have prompted some scholars to query
whether Bolivia’s use of environmental personhood was a
“window-dressing exercise” designed to promote Bolivia’s ethnoecologist image on the world stage rather than to safeguard the
environment.70
Finally, the government of Uganda, like those of Ecuador and
Bolivia, has a record of prioritizing national economic growth over
ecological integrity, notwithstanding its recent statutory
implementation of rights of nature.71 Under Uganda’s statutory
personhood scheme, the Minister responsible for the environment
is empowered to, by regulation, prescribe the conservation areas
to which rights of nature apply.72 The conferral of this broad
ministerial discretion is concerning in light of the government’s
65. Caleb Stevens et al., Ecuador Shows Why Communities and the Climate Need Strong
Forest
Rights,
WORLD
RESOURCES
INSTITUTE
(Sep.
19,
2014),
https://www.wri.org/insights/ecuador-shows-why-communities-and-climate-needstrong-forest-rights [https://perma.cc/Z27G-J533].
66. Cardona, supra note 64; see also Calzadilla & Kotzé, Somewhere Between Rhetoric
and Reality, supra note 46, at 418.
67. Calzadilla & Kotzé, Living in Harmony, supra note 50, at 419.
68. Calzadilla & Kotzé, Living in Harmony, supra note 50, at 420.
69. Yvette Sierra Praeli, Conservationists Urge Reforms in Bolivia After Environmental,
(Mar.
27,
2020),
Political
Crises,
MONGABAY
https://news.mongabay.com/2020/03/conservationists-urge-reforms-in-bolivia-afterenvironmental-political-crises/ [https://perma.cc/AR2L-EFR9]; see also Francesco
Cantini et al., Evidence-Based Integrated Analysis of Environmental Hazards in Southern
Bolivia, 16 INT. J. ENV’T RSCH. 2107 (2019).
70. Calzadilla & Kotzé, Living in Harmony, supra note 50, at 415.
71. Matthew W. Hopewell, The Rights of Nature in Uganda: Exploring the Emergence,
Power and Transformative Quality of a ‘New Wave’ of Environmentalism 6 (July 9, 2019)
(MSc Dissertation, University of London).
72. National Environment Act 2019, § 4(4) (Act No. 5/2019) (Uganda).
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extractive aspirations. In the immediate aftermath of Uganda’s
implementation of the rights of nature, oil fields continued to be
developed in the Albertine Rift on the ancestral lands of the
Bagungu people.73 In April 2021, governmental officials signed
final agreements to allow private entities to extract approximately
1.7 billion barrels of oil in that region, including in land within a
national park and directly adjacent to a United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization wetland.74 Of the
interrelationship between Uganda’s new rights of nature and its
developmental aspirations, Naomi Karekaho, spokesperson for
Uganda’s National Environment Management Authority, recently
stated, “[N]ature definitely has its own rights. But so do people and
so does development.”75
Conversely, granting rights to nature may be a way to better
protect the environment where governments are unable or
unwilling to protect the state’s natural resources. As one critic
notes:
History has shown that governments and the law have failed
to safeguard the environment upon which civilization
depends. In a system that has so much hope, trust, and reliance
on the mechanical wrenching of the adversarial push-and-pull
to extract justice, perhaps it is only logical that Nature be given
the power to advocate for itself—especially when its foremost
historical enemies, governments and corporations, yield so
much legal force.76

Justice William O. Douglas of the United States Supreme Court
famously referenced Stone’s argument for environmental
personhood in his powerful 1972 dissent in Sierra Club v. Morton.77
In Morton, a non-profit environmental conservation organization
attempted to prevent the development of a large resort complex in
the Sierra Nevada Mountains.78 The Sierra Club argued that its
73. Jack Losh, Uganda Joins the Rights-of-Nature Movement but Won’t Stop Oil Drilling,
GEOGRAPHIC
(June
3,
2021),
NAT’L
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/article/uganda-joins-the-rights-ofnature-movement-but-wont-stop-oil-drilling [https://perma.cc/3UX5-36AK].
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Bilof, supra note 51, at 133.
77. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 729, 742-43 (1972); see also Bilof, supra note
51, at 129-30.
78. Bilof, supra note 51, at 120-22.
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“longstanding concern with and expertise in [environmental]
matters were sufficient to give it standing as a ‘representative of
the public.’”79 Ultimately that argument was unsuccessful.80
However, Justice Douglas stated in dissent that “those who have
that intimate relation with the inanimate object about to be
injured, polluted, or otherwise despoiled are its legitimate
spokesmen.”81 He opined that granting rights to nature could result
in improved environmental outcomes in circumstances where
federal regulatory agencies were “notoriously under the control of
powerful interests who manipulate them through advisory
committees, or friendly working relations.”82
Similarly, some scholars have argued that the development of
the doctrine of environmental personhood is essential in India to
combat the government’s repressive approach to environmental
activists.83
As the above examples demonstrate, the extent to which
environmental personhood will result in enhanced environmental
protection is likely to depend upon the strength of the conferring
instrument and the political will to protect the environment
underlying it.84
The rationale underlying the conferral of rights on nature also
includes that it may further First Nations sovereignty. The
following Section considers the merits of this argument.
3. Recognition of First Nations Modes of Custodianship
Some scholars have posited that through providing rights to
nature and codifying First Nations conceptions into law within
environmental personhood
frameworks, First
Nations
79. Id. at 120-22.
80. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 727, 735, 741.
81. Megan Schmiesing, Rights, Water, and Guardians: How Rights of Nature
Movements are Reshaping our Current Environmental Ethics and What These Policies
Need to be Successful 8 (2020) (Thesis, Claremont Graduate University).
82. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 727, 729, 745.
83. Palash Srivastav, Legal Personality of Ganga and Ecocentrism 4 CAMB. L. REV. 151,
151-68 (2019); see also Joanna Slater & Niha Masih, In India, a Climate Activist’s Arrest
(Feb.
18,
2021),
Shows
Shrinking
Space
for
Dissent,
WASH. POST
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/india-modidissent/2021/02/17/b6ab6ec8-7059-11eb-8651-6d3091eac63f_story.html
[https://perma.cc/SN26-BBA7].
84. Good, supra note 46, at 40.
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communities may be granted more agency within their custodial
lands.85
Two statutes enacted in New Zealand illustrate this rationale.
In 2014, the Te Urewera protected area was granted legal
personhood.86 The Te Urewera Act 2014 (“Te Urewera Act”)
recognized Te Urewera as “a place of spiritual value,” that
possesses “its own mana and mauri,” “an identity in and of itself,”87
and a deep connection to the Tūhoe people.88 The Act created the
Te Urewera Board, which is made up of four members appointed
by the trustees of Tūhoe Te Uru Taumatua, and four appointed by
the Crown.89
The Te Urewera Act vests the fee simple estate of Te Urewera
establishment land in Te Urewera itself, as opposed to its
representative entity or the Tūhoe people.90 The drafters of this
provision have stated that it was intended to “sidestep” the vexed
issue of ownership and reassure non-First Nations New Zealanders
that a proprietary interest in Te Urewera (previously a national
park) was not to be vested in any one group.91
Tănăsescu highlights the paucity of Māori terms in the
operational provisions of that statute in comparison to the
prevalence of Western bureaucratic and managerial frameworks.92
Conversely, Gordon defends the radical nature of the Te Urewera
Act, labelling it an “unequivocal rejection of a human-centered
rights regime for protecting nature as property.”93
The Te Urewera Act has enhanced the Tūhoe peoples’ ability
to manage Te Urewera in accordance with their traditional
practices. When Te Urewera was a national park managed by the
85. Sheber, supra note 39, at 166.
86. Te Urewera Act, 2014 (Act No. 51/2014) (N.Z.).
87. Id. § 3.
88. Id. § 4.
89. Id. § 21(1). For a detailed consideration of the background of that Act see Craig
M. Kauffman, Managing People for the Benefit of the Land: Practicing Earth Jurisprudence
in
Te
Urewera,
New
Zealand,
http://files.harmonywithnatureun.org/uploads/upload923.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PN6Q-JDKT] (last visited Oct. 7, 2021).
90. Te Urewera Act, 2014, § 12.
91. Kauffman, supra note 89, at 10.
92. Mihnea Tănăsescu, Rights of Nature, Legal Personality and Indigenous
Philosophies, 9 TRANSNAT’L ENV’T L. 429, 445 (2020).
93. Gwendolyn J. Gordon, Environmental Personhood, 43 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 49, 52
(2018).
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Department of Conservation, the Department controlled the
burgeoning possum population by the use of a toxic spray.94
Following the enactment of the Te Urewera Act, Tūhoe custodians
commenced possum trapping and hunting as a means to control
possum populations while lessening the risk of adverse
environmental impacts as a result of toxic bait use.95 In turn, these
activities have provided a sustainable livelihood for Tūhoe families
who consume possum meat and sell possum fur.96 In their
interviews with Craig Kauffman, environmental politics scholar,
regarding these practices, Tūhoe hunters expressed a sense of duty
to help maintain the possum population at a level that would not
overwhelm the ecosystem.97 Kauffman concluded, “[T]he Tūhoe
play a natural role in the forest’s food web so that the forest
ecosystem can sustain itself.”98
In 2017, the Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims
Settlement) Act 2017 (NZ) (“Te Awa Tupua Act”) became the second
statute in New Zealand to declare an ecosystem a legal person.99
The Te Awa Tupua Act recognized the status of Te Awa Tupua, that
is, “an indivisible and living whole, comprising the Whanganui
River from the mountains to the sea, incorporating all its physical
and metaphysical elements.”100 Additionally, that Act provided that
Tupua te Kawa comprises the intrinsic values that represent the
essence of Te Awa Tupua, including “Ko te Awa te mātāpuna o te
ora: the River is the source of spiritual and physical sustenance,”
and “Ko au te Awa, ko te Awa ko au: I am the River and the River is
me.”101 The function of the River’s representative entity, Te Pou
Tupua, is to uphold the status of both Te Awa Tupua and Tupua te
Kawa.102 That entity is made up of one representative nominated
by the Whanganui iwi, and one by the Crown.103 Support is offered

94. Kauffman, supra note 89, at 21.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 22.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Toni Collins & Shea Esterling, Fluid Personality: Indigenous Rights and the Te Awa
Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017 in Aotearoa New Zealand, 20 MELB. J.
INT’L L. 1 (2019).
100. Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017, § 12 (N.Z.).
101. Id. § 13.
102. Id. § 19(1)(b).
103. Id. § 20.
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to that entity by Te Karewao, an advisory group.104 A strategy
group, Te Kōpuka nā Te Awa Tupua, is also established under that
Act.105 That group consists of stakeholders such as Whanganui iwi,
local and central government personnel, and representatives from
the tourism, conservation, recreation, and wild game industries.106
The Act also creates a contestable fund.107
Under the Te Awa Tupua Act, the vesting of the Crown-owned
parts of the bed of the Whanganui River in Te Awa Tupua does not
transfer a proprietary interest in water to its representative entity
or to the Whanganui iwi.108 Moreover, Te Pou Tupua’s consent is
not required to use water from the River.109 On that basis, critics
claim that the statute does not sufficiently enhance the Whanganui
iwi’s ability to manage the River.110
Critically, while both statutes considered above restore a level
of Māori stewardship over the ecosystems they affect, they were
also enacted as a result of the Crown’s refusal to grant the Tūhoe
and the Whanganui iwi ownership of either ecosystem, and neither
statute confers substantive proprietary rights on the traditional
custodians of those resources.
It has been proposed that New Zealand’s rights of nature
model could be adapted to an Australian context.111 However, Dr.
Virginia Marshall, Inaugural Indigenous Postdoctoral Fellow with
the Australian National University's School of Regulation and
Global Governance and the Fenner School of Environment and
Society, opines that granting rights to nature is antithetical to
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ cultural obligations

104. Id. §§ 14, 27.
105. Id. pt. 2 (4).
106. Id. § 32(1).
107. Erin L. O’Donnell & Julia Talbot-Jones, Creating Legal Rights for Rivers: Lessons
from Australia, New Zealand, and India, 23 ECOLOGY & SOC. 7 (2018); see also Sequoia L.
Butler, ‘I Am the River, the River Is Me’: How Environmental Personhood Can Protect Tribal
Food Systems, 38 WIS. INT’L L.J. 79, 90 (2020).
108. Abigail Hutchison, The Whanganui River as a Legal Person, 39 ALT. L.J. (GAUNT)
179, 181-82 (2014); see also Katie O’Bryan, Giving a Voice to the River and the Role of
Indigenous People: The Whanganui River Settlement and River Management in Victoria, 20
AUSTL. INDIGENOUS L. REV. 48, 57 (2017).
109. O’Bryan, supra note 108, at 57.
110. Id. at 68-69; Collins & Esterling, supra note 99, at 4-5.
111. O’Bryan, supra note 108, at 50.
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to care for custodial lands112 and considers that environmental
personhood is merely a “new tool of colonization which would
decouple Indigenous ontological relationships and laws and the
inherent obligations to manage and care for the environment.”113
Additionally, the rights of nature movement may compromise the
myriad exclusive and non-exclusive property rights to land and
water that have been vested in First Nations communities under
various Australian federal, state, and territory laws.114 Dr Marshall
therefore concludes:
The answer to inadequate or poorly performing government
policies and law is not to retreat to legal personhood; not to
separate the rivers, the creeks and the mountains, the national
heritage areas or the national parks from Indigenous peoples.
The answer is to meaningfully consult and engage with
Indigenous communities and give those communities a
significant and central role in the management of Australia’s
land, waters and resources.115

There is, moreover, abundant evidence that conferring rights
on nature will not necessarily further First Nations interests. For
example, despite the inclusion of First Nations concepts in Bolivia’s
statutory personhood framework, the exploitation of First Nations
custodial lands remains rife in Bolivia. In August 2017, Evo
Morales’ government enacted the Law on Protection, Integral and
Sustainable Development of the Isiboro Secure National Park and
Indigenous Territory (“Law on Protection”) which repealed an
earlier law disallowing the construction of transport infrastructure
on the traditional lands of the Tsimané, Yuracaré and MojeñoTrinitario peoples.116 Those peoples had no right to reject such
works notwithstanding their right to prior informed consent under
Article 16.1 of the Framework Law 300 of Mother Earth and Integral
Development for Living Well of 2012 (“Framework Law”).117
In 2019 the IRNT found that the Law on Protection was invalid
because there had been inadequate consultation with First Nations
112. Virginia Marshall, Removing the Veil from the ‘Rights of Nature’: The Dichotomy
between First Nations Customary Rights and Environmental Legal Personhood, AUSTL.
FEMINIST L.J. 1, 2 (2020).
113. Id. at 2.
114. Id. at 5.
115. Id. at 16.
116. Calzadilla & Kotzé, Living in Harmony, supra note 50, at 423.
117. Id. at 416-17.
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peoples prior to its enactment. In making this finding the IRNT had
regard to Bolivia’s statutory personhood framework, protections
for First Nations peoples in the Bolivian Constitution and Supreme
Court jurisprudence.118 The IRNT ordered that the Bolivian
Government immediately halt the construction of the relevant
road infrastructure. However, as at the date of writing, this is yet
to occur and the Bolivian Minister of State, Carlos Romero Bonifaz,
has publicly rejected the authority of the IRNT.119
While, in some cases, environmental personhood may
constitute a useful mechanism to advance First Nations
sovereignty, there is a danger in over-emphasizing the
interconnectedness between the rights of nature and First Nations
interests. Moreover, consultation with First Nations communities
is key prior to the implementation of rights of nature
frameworks.120
Having considered the rationale underlying environmental
personhood, an analysis of the types of rights that have been
conferred on nature and who is able to protect those rights is
necessary.
B.

Types of Rights and Approaches to Standing

The types of rights that have been conferred upon nature vary
widely.121 Express rights have been conferred on nature by
constitution and statute in several jurisdictions, including Ecuador,
Bolivia, Uganda, and New Zealand. In other jurisdictions, including
the United States, local government orders and First Nations laws
have conferred rights on nature. Conversely, courts have found
implied rights of nature in Colombia, India, and Bangladesh. These
rights have generally been inferred from constitutional provisions
118. See generally International Tribunal for the Rights of Nature, Case of the Isiboro
Sécure National Park and Indigenous Territory: Final Judgement (2019)
https://therightsofnature.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/TIPNIS-JudgementEnglish-.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2021).
119. Rights of Rivers, supra note 13, at 15.
120. Tănăsescu, supra note 92, at 453; see, e.g., Hopewell, supra note 71, at 29.
121. For a helpful comparison regarding the scope and strength of global
personhood regimes, see the table provided in Craig Kauffman & Pamela L. Martin,
Comparing Rights of Nature Laws in the U.S., Ecuador, and New Zealand: Evolving Strategies
in the Battle Between Environmental Protection and “Development”, in INT’L STUD. ASS’N ANN.
CONF. 20 (Feb. 23, 2017) [hereinafter Kauffman & Martin, Evolving Strategies]; see also
Rights of Rivers, supra note 13, at 6-7.
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requiring environmental protection and international rights of
nature jurisprudence. A detailed consideration of curial decisions
finding rights of nature and the burgeoning international
jurisprudence of environmental personhood is provided in Section
D of this article.
A survey of international rights of nature frameworks reveals
that the types of rights of nature broadly fall into the following
categories:122 a) positive enumerated rights (including to “exist,”
“thrive,” and “be restored”) granted to nature as a whole (“all of
nature rights”) and b) rights by analogy to a legal person granted
to particular ecosystems (“narrow personhood rights”).123 In some
cases, these categories overlap.
The standing mechanisms accompanying these frameworks
differ. Generally, in respect of all of nature rights a liberalized
standing model is adopted to enable all persons or all citizens of
the relevant country to enforce nature’s rights. Narrow
personhood rights tend to limit standing to a representative entity
tasked with speaking as the voice of the relevant ecosystem.
Conversely, in some jurisdictions, liberalized standing rules
are utilized to protect nature’s interests in lieu of granting rights to
nature. For example, in 2018 the Royal Court of Justice of Bhutan
constituted the Green Bench and developed a Bench Book allowing
for environmental protection actions to be brought by any person
as a “trustee” of nature.124 Similarly, the Philippines Supreme Court
Rules of Procedure 2010 provides that any “citizen in
representation of others, including minors or generations yet
unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under
environmental laws.”125

122. See Allison Katherine Athens, An Indivisible and Living Whole: Do We Value
Nature Enough to Grant It Personhood, 45 ECOLOGY L.Q. 187, 206 (2018); see also Craig
Kauffman, Guardianship Arrangements in Rights of Nature Legal Provisions, in EARTH LAW:
EMERGING ECOCENTRIC LAW—A GUIDE FOR PRACTITIONER (Anthony Zelle et al. eds., Wolters
Kluwer
2020)
http://files.harmonywithnatureun.org/uploads/upload922.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EH3Z-W2YS] (last visited Oct. 7, 2021).
123. Gordon, supra note 93, at 52; Jha & Ghosh, supra note 9.
124. Rights of Rivers, supra note 13, at 47.
125. Id.
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1. All of Nature Rights
This Section will examine all of nature rights and
corresponding standing rules that govern Ecuador, Bolivia, and
Uganda.
a. Ecuador
In 2008, the Ecuadorian Constitution enshrined broad rights
for Mother Earth, or Pachamama.126 Namely, Pachamama has the
right to exist, maintain, and regenerate vital cycles, structures,
functions, and evolutionary processes.127 Pachamama also has the
right to be restored when destroyed.128
Pachamama is recognized as the bearer of rights as “nature,”
distinct from “persons, people, communities and nationalities” and
“natural and juridical persons.”129 The Ecuadorian Constitution
does not introduce a hierarchy of rights, and therefore, the rights
of nature are not superior to any other category of right conferred
by that instrument.130 No regulation can restrict the content of any
constitutionally entrenched right without justification.131
However, concerningly, no constitutional guidance is offered as to
what constitutes “justification.”132
Broad standing rights are conferred by the Constitution. All
persons, communities, peoples, and nations are permitted to call
upon public authorities to enforce the rights of nature, subject to
the other provisions of the Constitution.133
Article 11(3) of the Constitution states that “rights shall be
fully actionable. Absence of a legal regulatory framework cannot
be alleged to justify their infringement or ignorance thereof, to
dismiss proceedings filed as a result of these actions, or to deny

126. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR Oct 20, 2008, arts. 71-74.
127. Id. art 71.
128. Id. art 72.
129. Gordon, supra note 93, at 52, 54 (citing CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF
ECUADOR, Oct. 20, 2008, arts. 10, 71, 72, and 74).
130. Calzadilla & Kotzé, Somewhere Between Rhetoric and Reality, supra note 46, at
419, 422.
131. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR Oct. 20, 2008, arts 11(4), 11(8), 71.
132. Calzadilla & Kotzé, Somewhere Between Rhetoric and Reality, supra note 46, at
419.
133. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR Oct. 20, 2008, art. 71; Calzadilla &
Kotzé, Somewhere Between Rhetoric and Reality, supra note 46, at 424.
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their recognition.”134 That is, those provisions are directly
justiciable.135
Kauffman and Pamela L. Martin, politics and international
relations scholar, have identified the following categories of
litigation and administrative action in Ecuador which commonly
invoke the constitutional rights of nature: (a) litigation seeking the
protection of the rights of nature including by the restoration of
damaged ecosystems or preventative action to mitigate future
degradation in either the civil or constitutional courts of Ecuador;
(b) litigation seeking to punish offenders for environmental crimes
contained in the Ecuadorian Penal Code; and (c) administrative
action by government agencies to uphold the rights of nature,
including by the imposition of fines, revocation of licenses, eviction
of companies from sites of environmental significance, and the
restoration of damaged ecosystems.136
By 2016, Ecuadorian courts had considered thirteen claims
brought under the constitutional rights of nature provisions.137
Ten of those claims prevailed in favor of Pachamama, including one
concerning the pollution of the Vilcabamba River, which is
considered in detail at Section D of this article.138 These claims
related to illegal mining, logging, fishing, and the disposal of
waste.139 Of those cases, four were initiated by a government
entity; four were criminal matters; and the remaining were
constitutional actions commenced by individual citizens and civic
groups. As of 2019, plaintiffs had initiated twenty-four claims
under Ecuador’s constitutional rights of nature.140

134. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR Oct. 20, 2008, art. 11(3). See also
Calzadilla & Kotzé, Somewhere Between Rhetoric and Reality, supra note 46, at 418.
135. Calzadilla & Kotzé, Somewhere Between Rhetoric and Reality, supra note 46, at
419.
136. Craig Kauffman & Pamela Martin, Can Rights of Nature Make Development More
Sustainable? Why Some Ecuadorian Lawsuits Succeed and Others Fail, 92 WORLD DEV. 130,
133 (2017) [hereinafter Kauffman & Martin, Can Rights of Nature].
137. For a summary of these cases, see id. at app.
138. Eric Alston, Ecuador’s 2008 Constitution: The Political Economy of Securing an
Aspirational Social Contract, 3 CONST. STUD. 69, 88 n.27 (2018).
139. Id. at 88 n.27.
140. Craig M. Kauffman, Why Rights of Nature Laws are Implemented in Some Cases
and Not Others: The Controlled Comparison of Bolivia and Ecuador, INT’L STUD. ASS’N ANN.
CONF. 8 (Mar. 29, 2019) http://files.harmonywithnatureun.org/uploads/upload861.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PF62-8HBF].
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b. Bolivia
While Bolivia’s 2009 Constitution provides a human right to a
healthy, protected, and balanced environment,141 it does not
constitutionally entrench the rights of nature like its Ecuadorian
counterpart.142 The rights of nature in Bolivian law are set out in
the Law 071 of the Rights of Mother Earth of 2010 (“Law of the
Rights of Mother Earth”).143 The Framework Law operationalizes
these rights in the context of development for living well or vivir
bien.144
The Law of the Rights of Mother Earth describes the legal
status of Mother Earth as follows:
For the purpose of protecting and enforcing its rights, Mother
Earth takes on the character of collective public interest.
Mother Earth and all its components, including human
communities, are entitled to all the inherent rights recognized
in this Law. The exercise of the rights of Mother Earth will take
into account the specificities and particularities of its various
components. The rights under this Act shall not limit the
existence of other rights of Mother Earth.145

The rights of Mother Earth under that statute include the
rights to life, diversity of life, water, clean air, equilibrium,
restoration, and pollution-free living.146
Like the Ecuadorian regime, Bolivia’s framework does not
confer personhood on nature per se. Rather, it strips human
persons of their dominance over nature by conferring on nature its
own competing set of rights.147
Article 6 of the statute grants broad standing rights to protect
Mother Earth to the citizens of Bolivia: “All Bolivians, to join the
community of beings comprising Mother Earth, exercise rights
under this Act, in a way that is consistent with their individual and
collective rights.”148
141. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO [CONSTITUTION] Feb. 7, 2009, art. 33 (Bol.).
142. Calzadilla & Kotzé, Living in Harmony, supra note 50, at 399.
143. See generally Ley de Derechos de la Madre Tierra [Law of the Rights of Mother
Earth], Law 071 (2010) (Bol.).
144. Calzadilla & Kotzé, Living in Harmony, supra note 50, at 399.
145. Law of the Rights of Mother Earth, Law 071, art. 5 (2010) (Bol.).
146. Id. art. 7.
147. Gordon, supra note 93, at 54-55.
148. Law of the Rights of Mother Earth, Law 071, Art. 6 (2010) (Bol.).
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The Law provides for the establishment of the Office of
Mother Earth to ensure the protection and fulfillment of Mother
Earth’s rights.149 However, as of 2019 the Office had not been
established.150
Importantly, the ecocentric provisions considered above are
arguably diluted by the obligation of the Bolivian state to “develop
balanced forms of production and patterns of consumption to
satisfy the needs of the Bolivian people to live well.”151
The authors of this article are unaware of any actions that
have been brought pursuant to Bolivia’s statutory rights of nature.
c. Uganda
In March 2019 Uganda enacted statutory rights of nature
similar to those introduced in Ecuador and Bolivia.152 The National
Environment Act 2019 confers rights on nature “to exist, persist,
maintain and regenerate its vital cycles, structure, functions and its
processes in evolution.”153
The Act provides liberalized standing procedures granting all
persons "a right to bring an action before a competent court for any
infringement of rights of nature under this Act".154
Pursuant to the Act, the Ugandan government established a
Policy Committee on Environment for strategic policy guidance on
the environment. The Committee is comprised entirely of
government ministers.155
2. Narrow Personhood Rights
Other jurisdictions have favored a narrow personhood
approach, conferring rights on nature by analogy to a legal person
or legal entity and limiting standing to bodies appointed to
represent the interests of those ecosystems.

149. Calzadilla & Kotzé, Living in Harmony, supra note 50, at 409-10, 413; White,
supra note 26, at 145.
150. Rights of Rivers, supra note 13, at 22.
151. Law of the Rights of Mother Earth, Law 071, Art. 8(2) (2010) (Bol.).
152. National Environment Act, 2019 (Act No. 5/2019) (Uganda).
153. Id. § 4(1).
154. Id. § 4(2).
155. Id. § 6(2).
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a. New Zealand
The Te Urewera Act declares Te Urewera a legal entity with all
the rights, powers, duties, and liabilities of a legal person. However,
the exercise of these functions is limited to its representative
entity, the Te Urewera Board (the structure of which is described
above in Section A).156 Similarly, the Te Awa Tupua Act declares Te
Awa Tupua to be a legal person who has “all the rights, powers,
duties, and liabilities of a legal person.”157 The representative
entity, Te Pou Tupua, is tasked with exercising those functions.158
Those statutes are rarely invoked in New Zealand, likely
because their implementation had bipartisan support, was
relatively uncontroversial, and the representative entities
established to protect the interests of those ecosystems are yet to
encounter substantial difficulties.159 However, a test of the efficacy
of the Te Awa Tupua Act may arise if there is a legal conflict
regarding the diversion of the waters of the River by Genesis
Power Company. Genesis’s hydropower system currently diverts
the waters of the Whanganui River and five of its upper tributaries.
The company’s consents will expire in 2039.160
b. Australia
The Australian State of Victoria adapted parts of New
Zealand’s environmental personhood framework in 2017 when it
enacted the Yarra River Protection (Wilip-gin Birrarung murron)
Act 2017.161 That Act recognizes the status of the Yarra River as a
living entity162 but does not confer legal personhood or rights on
the River itself. The statute appointed a body, the Birrarung
Council, as the independent voice of that river.163 The role of the
Birrarung Council to advocate for the Yarra River is similar to the
guardianship model adopted in the New Zealand statutes
considered above.164 The Act provides that at least two of the
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Te Urewera Act 2014, § 11 (Act No. 51/2014) (N.Z.).
Te Awa Tupua Act 2017, § 14 (N.Z.).
Id. § 14(2).
Rights of Rivers, supra note 13, at 18.
Zartner, supra note 37, at 22-23.
Yarra River Protection Act 2017, (Austl).
Id. pt. 1 § 1(a).
Id. pt. 5 § 46-48.
Rights of Rivers, supra note 13, at 19.
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twelve members of the Birrarung Council must be nominees of
Wurundjeri Tribe Land and the Compensation Cultural Heritage
Council Inc.165
c. Curial Decisions
As Section D of this article demonstrates, several curial
decisions have also adopted a narrow personhood approach,
directly citing New Zealand’s statutes considered above.
3. Comparing the Types of Rights
Any analysis of the comparative efficacy of the types of rights
considered above must be tempered by an acknowledgment that
the practical impacts of those frameworks are yet to be seen.166 For
example, it is too soon to tell whether the Te Awa Tupua Act will
positively advance the environmental outcomes of the Whanganui
River.167 In late 2019, Adam Daniel, a biologist employed to
monitor the health of the river, emphasized the long-term
pollution challenges facing the river and raised concerns about the
river’s turbidity as a result of intensive agriculture along its
banks.168
Additionally, there are limits to the helpfulness of comparing
the efficacy of legislative and policy frameworks between states.169
For example, despite the similarities between the Ecuadorian and
Bolivian rights of nature regimes, the implementation of the rights
of nature has proven to be dramatically different in each
jurisdiction.170 Environmental personhood jurisprudence
continues to strengthen in Ecuador as a result of the litigation
discussed above and, in more detail, below. Additionally, the
Ecuadorian Ministry of the Environment has invoked rights of
nature to justify regulatory actions and judges have recognized the
165. Yarra River Protection Act, 2017, § 49(1)(a) (Austl.).
166. Rights of Rivers, supra note 13, at 18.
167. Jeremy Lurgio, Saving the Whanganui: Can Personhood Rescue a River?,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 30, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/30/savingthe-whanganui-can-personhood-rescue-a-river
[https://perma.cc/4HDK-XFW4];
Catriona May, Should Rivers Have Legal Rights?, UNIV. MELBOURNE (July 30, 2020),
https://law.unimelb.edu.au/news/MLS/should-rivers-have-legal-rights
[https://perma.cc/C6SU-S5Z6]; Rights of Rivers, supra note 13, at 18.
168. Lurgio, supra note 167.
169. O’Bryan, supra note 108, at 50.
170. Kauffman, supra note 140, at 2.
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rights of nature in their rulings even where plaintiffs have not
invoked those provisions. Finally, Ecuador’s National Ombudsman
regularly investigates rights of nature violations.171 These factors
suggest that the normative weight of rights of nature continues to
steadily increase in Ecuador. By comparison, Kauffman opines,
there is little evidence that the government is implementing
Bolivia’s rights of nature regime.172
Notwithstanding these difficulties, a cautious evaluation of
the efficacy of the various types of rights of nature can be
attempted.
With respect to the respective merits and limitations of all of
nature rights and narrow personhood rights, Kauffman states that:
It is debatable which model provides stronger protections for
the rights of nature. Theoretically, when authority to
represent nature is distributed broadly, the barriers to
defending nature’s rights are lower. However, empowering
people to protect nature by invoking rights of nature is not the
same thing as requiring them to do so. When rights are not
accompanied by the assignment of responsibilities, rights of
nature legal provisions may be weakened. New Zealand’s
rights of nature laws, for example, emphasize the concept of
responsibility much more than rights. These laws create
statutory guardians charged with promoting and protecting
the interests, well-being, and rights of the river Te Awa Tupua
and the forest Te Urewera. While this legal design limits who
can represent nature, advocates argue that this guardianship
model is stronger because it appoints representatives who are
legally mandated to advocate for nature’s interests and protect
its rights, not only in courts but also in policy and social
forums.173

All of nature rights can be criticized on several bases.174 First,
their breadth makes their implementation uncertain. Writing in
2013, Good considered that these rights were so broad that it was
unclear whether they could ever provide a basis for a legal cause
171. Id.
172. See Kauffman, supra note 140, at 2; see also Yifan He et al., Guardians of the
Forests: How Should an Indigenous Community in Eastern Bolivia Defend Their Land and
Forests Under Increasing Political and Economic Pressures? 3 CASE STUDIES IN THE ENV’T 1,
10-11 (2019).
173. Kauffman, supra note 122, at 17.
174. Darpö, supra note 61, at 22.
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of action or were rather intended as statements of policy.175 Others
have labelled all of nature rights “impractical” and opined that they
are “likely to confuse courts and litigants alike.”176 Second, the
expansive breadth of the standing mechanisms that generally
accompany these rights run the risk of “flooding the courts with
non-meritorious claims.”177 Third, the conferral of rights on nature
as a whole could result in absurd outcomes, such as water being
held liable for damage caused by flooding.178 For that reason, Lillo
opines that the preferable approach is to identify a specific
ecosystem upon which rights are conferred.179 Fourth, Gordon
considers that under all of nature rights frameworks it is difficult
to partition conflicting interests in a principled way. She considers
that the Bolivian government’s prioritization of extractive industry
(considered in Section A of this article) exemplifies this.180 Fifth, all
of nature rights are less amenable to the construction of
representative or guardian entities because they necessarily
encompass a variety of dynamic ecosystems.181 This means that no
one is obligated to speak on behalf of the environment and legal
action is voluntary.182
Several scholars note the efficacy of New Zealand’s approach
to environmental personhood. Dana Zartner, international law
scholar, recently wrote that, “while still new and relatively
untested, Te Awa Tupua, is probably the most successful rights of
nature law in existence.”183 Other commentators have observed
that, by reason of its precision, New Zealand’s mode of statutory
recognition may avoid a main criticism typically directed at
environmental personhood regimes, namely, ambiguity in
application (as considered above).184 The benefits of the inclusion
of a number of stakeholders in the organizational structure of New

175. Good, supra note 46, at 35.
176. Mary Elizabeth Whittenmore, The Problem of Enforcing Nature’s Rights Under
Ecuador’s Constitution: Why the 2008 Environmental Amendments Have No Bite 20 PAC. RIM
L. & POL’Y J. 659, 667, 669 (2011).
177. Babcock, supra note 45, at 4.
178. Lillo, supra note 6, at 187.
179. Id. at 186.
180. Gordon, supra note 93, at 83-84.
181. Kauffman, supra note 122, at 1.
182. Id. at 2.
183. Zartner, supra note 37, at 3.
184. Good, supra note 46, at 40.
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Zealand’s statutory rights of nature has also been emphasized.185
Finally, Gordon notes that the strength of the New Zealand statutes
is derived from the dual “legal and cultural heft” the statutes
embody.186
The Te Urewera Act and the Te Awa Tupua Act contain several
elements that can be characterized as best practice.187 Namely,
those statutes prioritize First Nations interests by the creation of
representative entities with Māori membership.188 Therefore,
critically, those entities include independent non-government
representatives.189 In addition, the statutes provide a detailed
organizational structure for the management of the representative
entities.190 The representative entities are embedded within the
governance of the ecosystems, meaning that the rights of the
relevant ecosystem can be protected through policy-making
processes rather than merely by litigation.191 Finally, the statutes
operationalize funding arrangements for the management of the
ecosystems.192
C.

Creating Rights of Nature

Rights have been conferred on nature by way of constitutional
enactment, statutory enactment, local government ordinance,
Tribal Code, and curial decisions. This Section will focus on the
former four methods of rights creation and their respective
advantages and limitations. Court-conferred personhood will be
considered in Section D of this article through several case studies.
1. Constitutional Recognition
The constitutional enactment of the rights of nature has
greater legal and normative force when compared to other modes
of recognition. This is due to the status of constitutions as supreme
laws, generally prevailing over statute to the extent of any
inconsistency and requiring special measures for their
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Jha & Ghosh, supra note 9, at 500.
Gordon, supra note 93, at 86-87.
See O’Donnell & Talbot-Jones, supra note 107, at 7.
Te Awa Tupua Act 2017, § 20 (N.Z.); Te Urewera Act 2014, § 21 (N.Z.).
Id.
Te Awa Tupua Act 2017, pt. 2 (N.Z.); Te Urewera Act 2014, pt. 2 (N.Z.).
Kauffman, supra note 122, at 1.
Butler, supra note 107, at 88-89; Te Urewera Act 2014, §§ 38-40, 53 (N.Z.).
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amendment, such as legislative supermajority or referendum.193
Furthermore, enshrining environmental rights constitutionally
can augment the social and legal legitimacy of these rights.194
As stated in Section B above, however, the efficacy of
constitutional rights of nature will be diluted if the relevant
provisions are poorly drafted, ambiguous, unaccompanied by
sufficiently broad standing regimes, or if constitutionally
entrenched pro-development prerogatives compete with those
rights.195 Additionally, although a strong protective measure, the
constitutional recognition of the rights of nature is difficult to
secure.196 For example, any attempt to amend Australia’s
Constitution to include the rights of nature would face numerous
obstacles, including the Australian public’s reticence to
constitutional amendment, the lack of clarity around whether
there is a constitutional power to implement such a measure, and
Australia’s continued dependence on the natural resources
sector.197
The difficulty of constitutionally entrenching the rights of
nature is exemplified by the fact that only one state—Ecuador—
has adopted this course. Former Ecuadorian President Rafael
Correa, a democratic socialist, was elected to office in 2006 on a
progressive platform.198 Correa incorporated the promise of
constitutional reform into his mandate and called for a referendum
to draft a new constitution through a participatory process.199 The
main proponents of the incorporation of personhood provisions
into that instrument were a group of environmentalist lawyers and
activists. It is unlikely that their efforts would have succeeded if not
for the groundwork laid by environmental social movements of

193. See Constitutional Beginnings: Making and Amending Constitutions, MELBOURNE
F.
ON
CONST.-BLDG.,
Oct.
2018,
at
1,
4,
https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/2903693/MF-ConstitutionalINSIGHT-01-Constitutional-beginnings.pdf [https://perma.cc/5G7X-XTZU].
194. Rachel Pepper & Harry Hobbs, The Environment is All Rights: Human Rights,
Constitutional Rights and Environmental Rights, 44 MEL. U. L. REV. 634, 661 (2021).
195. Id. at 662-63.
196. See generally Athens, supra note 122, at 204-05.
197. Good, supra note 46, at 39-40.
198. Knauß, supra note 46, at 707-08.
199. Maria Akchurin, Constructing the Rights of Nature: Constitutional Reform,
Mobilization, and Environmental Protection in Ecuador 40 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 937, 942
(2018).
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prior decades200 and the fact that by the late twentieth century,
Ecuadorian First Nations groups were powerful political actors
organized into a national movement led by the Confederation of
Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador.201
It would appear that Ecuador’s constitutionally entrenched
rights of nature resulted from a unique political moment in
Ecuador’s history.
2. Statutory Rights of Nature
Statutory personhood regimes also carry significant legal
force, and, where implemented on a national level in federal
systems, usually prevail over incompatible state legislation.202 As
Zartner considers with respect to the Te Awa Tupua Act, “Now
codified as national legislation, Te Awa Tupua is on equal legal
footing with other laws such as the Resources Management Act. It
‘sits alongside other statutes,’ but it doesn’t invalidate existing
laws. Correspondingly, other laws cannot invalidate consideration
of Te Awa Tupua and the interests of the Whanganui.”203
Moreover, the Te Awa Tupua Act provides that any person
exercising functions under twenty-five enumerated statutes “must
recognise and provide for” the status of Te Awa Tupua as a legal
person and Tupua te Kawa. Tupua te Kawa are the intrinsic values
that represent the essence of Te Awa Tupua contained in section
13 of the Te Awa Tupua Act.204 That is, the values of Tupua te Kawa
must be reflected in the outcome of any decision made by an officer
pursuant to those twenty-five statutes.205
However, much like Ecuador’s constitutional rights of nature,
statutory rights of nature have been implemented because of
unique political moments and the enhanced visibility of First
Nations voices. For example, the enactment of the Te Awa Tupua
Act resulted from the culmination of over a century of First Nations
200. Id. at 939; see also Walley supra note 48, at 5-6.
201. Akchurin, supra note 199, at 948. See also Emma Bainbridge, Indigenous
UNIV.,
Mobilization
in
Ecuador:
The
Emergence
of
CONAIE,
BROWN
https://library.brown.edu/create/modernlatinamerica/chapters/chapter-6-theandes/moments-in-andean-history/indigenous-mobilization-in-ecuador/
[https://perma.cc/RCY7-6WJW] (last visited Oct. 7, 2021); Lalander, supra note 63, at 156.
202. Kauffman & Martin, Evolving Strategies, supra note 121, at 29-30.
203. Zartner, supra note 37, at 11-12.
204. O’Bryan, supra note 108, at 55.
205. Id. at 60.
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activism.206 The Whanganui iwi had asserted their claim to the
Whanganui River since 1873. In 1990, a claim relating to the
Whanganui River was filed in the Waitangi Tribunal on behalf of
the Whanganui iwi.207 Negotiations between the Whanganui iwi
and the government of New Zealand occurred from 2002 to 2004,
re-commencing in 2009. In March 2017, the settlement between
both parties was codified in the Te Awa Tupua Act.208
Similarly, Bolivia’s statutory recognition of the rights of
nature coincided with a rise in the political power of First Nations
peoples, following the election of the country’s first Indigenous
president, Evo Morales, in 2005.209
3. Local Government and First Nations Recognition of Rights of
Nature
In the United States, local government ordinances and First
Nations laws confer personhood on natural resources.210
The Tamaqua Borough Sewage Sludge Ordinance, passed in
2006,211 recognized the Tamaqua Borough ecosystem in
Pennsylvania as a legal person capable of enforcing civil rights.212
Similar rights of nature ordinances have been passed in Santa
Monica, California, Shapleigh, Maine, and Exeter, New
Hampshire.213 As of 2016, more than 150 local communities in
more than twenty-four towns and cities had passed rights of
nature ordinances in the United States.214
However, these ordinances have proven vulnerable to
invalidation.215 For example, on February 26, 2019, Toledo, Ohio,
passed the Lake Erie Bill of Rights (“LEBOR”).216 LEBOR conferred
on the Lake rights to “exist, flourish, and naturally evolve” and held
206. Butler, supra note 107, at 87-88.
207. Collins & Esterling, supra note 99, at 3.
208. Id. at 200.
209. Gordon, supra note 93, at 49, 53; White, supra note 26, at 144.
210. White, supra note 26, at 155-58; Rights of Rivers, supra note 13, at 39.
211. Tamaqua Borough Ordinance, supra note 22.
212. Id.
213. Jha & Ghosh, supra note 9, at 486. See also Devon Alexandra Berman, Lake Erie
Bill of Rights Gets the Ax: Is Legal Personhood for Nature Dead in the Water?, 20 SUSTAIN.
DEV. L. & POL’Y 15 (2019).
214. Susana Borràs, New Transitions from Human Rights to the Environment to the
Rights of Nature, 5 TRANSNAT’L ENV’T L. 113, 137 (2016); Jha & Ghosh, supra note 9, at 487.
215. Jha & Ghosh, supra note 9, at 486.
216. Schmiesing, supra note 81, at 27.
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liable any entity that violated Lake Erie’s rights.217 LEBOR was
enacted following several years of educational campaigns
coordinated by a grassroots community movement in partnership
with the Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund, an
organization that has been involved in the nature’s rights
movement in the Americas since the 1990s.218 However, the
ordinance was declared invalid in its entirety in early 2020
because it was unconstitutionally vague and exceeded the power
of the municipal government in Ohio.219
Several First Nations communities in the United States have
also implemented rights of nature. For example, in 2019 the White
Earth Band of Ojibwe in Minnesota formally recognized the
intrinsic rights of wild rice.220
Similarly, the Navajo Nation Code 2003 Title I § 295 provides
that, “All creation, from Mother Earth and Father Sky to the
animals, those who live in water, those who fly and plant life have
their own laws and have rights and freedoms to exist.”221
Because First Nations law enjoys greater sovereignty than
local government ordinances in the United States, such provisions
are likely to have greater longevity than local government
ordinances such as LEBOR.222
Grassroots efforts to implement rights of nature are likely to
continue to expand as communities adopt innovative ways to
combat environmental degradation. Recently, the Blue Mountains
City Council became the first Australian local government to
recognize environmental personhood when it supported a
mayoral minute on March 31, 2021 during a council meeting,
seeking the integration of the concept of the rights of nature into

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id.
Id.
Drewes Farm P’ship v. City of Toledo, 441 F. Supp. 3d (N.D. Ohio 2020).
Zartner, supra note 37, at 25-26.
Rights of Rivers, supra note 13, at 39.
Id. at 41.
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its future operations and planning.223 Significantly, Blue Mountains
City Council encompasses a World Heritage National Park.224
4. Evaluating the Methods of Conferring Rights on Nature
In summary, of the methods discussed above, local
government ordinances offer the weakest form of rights of nature
protection and have proven vulnerable to invalidation. As the
following Part of this article demonstrates, lower court decisions
are similarly vulnerable to appeal.
Therefore, constitutional and statutory recognition of rights
of nature are preferable in terms of strength and longevity. As the
Ecuadorian and New Zealand contexts demonstrate, however,
those frameworks have arisen as a result of unique political
situations and decades of First Nations activism and, therefore, are
not necessarily amenable to universal transplantation,225
particularly to non-settler states.
D.

A New Arena: Domestic Courts and Rights of Nature Litigation

Judiciaries in domestic legal systems have played a unique
and substantial role in giving effect to express rights of nature and
finding implied rights of nature. Rights of nature cases are
relatively few and therefore novel. An examination of judicial
approaches in novel cases can highlight the importance of judicial
independence, the nature of the judicial role, and the significance
of judicial reasoning to the development of the law in respect of the
rights of nature. This Section examines judicial developments in
Ecuador, Colombia, India, and Bangladesh.
Broadly speaking, courts in civil and common law systems
fulfill the essential function of dispute resolution. In the common
law world, a fundamental aspect of constitutional arrangements is

223. B.C. Lewis, Rights of nature new rule at Blue Mountains Council, BLUE MOUNTAINS
GAZETTE
(Apr.
29,
2021,
3:30
PM)
https://www.bluemountainsgazette.com.au/story/7228788/rights-of-nature-new-firstat-council/ [https://perma.cc/2KU7-R27U]; Blue Mountains City Council, ‘Council resolves
to integrate Rights of Nature into operations and planning’, BLUE MOUNTAINS CITY COUNCIL
(Apr. 15, 2021), https://www.bmcc.nsw.gov.au/media-centre/council-resolves-tointegrate-rights-of-nature-into-operations-and-planning [https://perma.cc/RC58-JRH3].
224. Blue Mountains City Council, supra note 223.
225. Schmiesing, supra note 81, at 59.
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that members of an independent judiciary resolve legal issues
brought before a court according to the rule of law.226
There is no doubt that stare decisis is deeply “woven into the
essential fabric of each common law country’s constitutional
ethos.”227 However, in some instances, novel developments require
overturning precedent, sometimes precedent that is long-standing.
The proper resolution of the issues in dispute may also
inevitably lead to judges developing the law. As the High Court of
Australia has written:
To suppose that this [the common law] was a body of rules
waiting always to be declared and applied may be for some
people satisfying as an abstract theory. But it is simply not true
in fact. It overlooks the creative element in the work of
courts . . . In a system based, as ours is, on case law and
precedent there is both an inductive and a deductive element
in judicial reasoning, especially in a court of final appeal for a
particular realm or territory.228

A majority of the High Court has opined that this “creative
element” of inductive and deductive reasoning may include: "(i)
applying accepted principles to new cases; (ii) reasoning from the
more fundamental of settled legal principles to new conclusions;
(iii) deciding that a category is not closed against unforeseen
instances which in reason might be subsumed thereunder"; and
(iv) deciding that, where the foundation for a rule of common law
depends upon another rule, which, by reason of shifts in the law, is
no longer maintained, the first rule no longer exists.229 Sir Owen
Dixon, former Chief Justice of Australia, contrasted the first three
categories of orthodox modes of legal reasoning with “an entirely
different thing,” being a discontented judge abandoning
longstanding legal principle in the name of social necessity or
226. Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, Commonwealth (Latimer House)
Principles on the Three Branches of Government, 33 (Feb. 2009),
https://www.cpahq.org/media/dhfajkpg/commonwealth-latimer-principles-webversion.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FUM-TQJT] [hereinafter Latimer House Principles].
227. B.V. Harris, Final Appellate Courts Overruling Their Own “Wrong” Precedents: The
Ongoing Search for Principle, 118 L. Q. REV. 408, 412 (2002); see Anthony Mason, The Use
and Abuse of Precedent, 4 AUSTL. BAR REV. 93 (1998).
228. Skelton v. Collins (1966) 115 CLR 94, 134, (Austl.) (Windeyer J.).
229. PGA v. The Queen (2012) 245 CLR 355 ¶29-30 (Austl.); see Owen Dixon,
Concerning Judicial Method, 29 AUSTL. L.J. 468, 472 (1956) (from which the High Court was
drawing).

350

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:2

social convenience.230 The High Court added the fourth category in
rejecting an argument that in 1963, despite a range of legal changes
related to the status of women and marriage in South Australia in
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a wife could not retract her
consent to sexual intercourse with her husband while lawfully
married.231 These principles of reasoning underscore the notion
that creativity is intrinsic to the method of the common law.
Both Colombia and Ecuador are civil law jurisdictions.232 This
means that the primary function of the courts in those jurisdictions
is to apply the law set out in the relevant civil codes and statutes,
and, where matters are unregulated, fill in the gaps according to
general principles found in those instruments.233 This description
of the judicial function may sound familiar to common law lawyers,
given the proliferation of statutes in these jurisdictions in recent
decades.234 In civil law countries with a strong separation of
powers, the task of creating law is in theory more strictly left to the
people’s representatives than in common law countries.235
Moreover, the doctrine of stare decisis is absent from civil law
jurisdictions, meaning that cases lack binding precedential force.
However, this difference between common and civil law systems
may be overstated given the influence senior courts exert on lower
courts in civil law jurisdictions.236 For example, both Ecuador and
Colombia have constitutional Bills of Rights that entrench rights
that constitutional courts are empowered to interpret and

230. Dixon, supra note 229.
231. PGA v. The Queen (2012) 245 CLR 355 (Austl.).
232. Juan Andres Fuentes, UPDATE: The Basic Structure of the Ecuadorian Legal
System
and
Legal
Research,
N.Y.U.
(March/April
2021),
https://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Ecuador1.html#Section_3_3
[https://perma.cc/6AG4-FUTX]; Antonio Ramirez, An Introduction to Colombian
Governmental Institutions and Primary Legal Sources, N.Y.U. (May 2007),
https://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Colombia.htm [https://perma.cc/UGY6-48ZE]
(last visited Oct. 7, 2021).
233. Caslav Pejovic, Civil Law and Common Law: Two Different Paths Leading to the
Same Goal, 32 VICT. UNIV. OF WELLINGTON L. REV. 817, 819 (2001).
234. See, e.g., Cincent Chiao, Hyperlexis and the Rule of Law, 27 LEGAL THEORY 126
(2021); Lord Steyn, Dynamic Interpretation Amidst an Orgy of Statutes, 3 EUR. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 245 (2004); Mark Leeming, Equity: Ageless in the ‘Age of Statutes’, 9 J. EQUITY 108
(2015); Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (1982).
235. See Felipe Sáez Garcia, The Nature of Judicial Reform in Latin America and Some
Strategic Considerations 13(5) AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1267 (1998).
236. Pejovic, supra note 233.
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enforce.237 Therefore, in the constitutional jurisdiction the role of
apical courts of both countries may more closely resemble that of
their common law counterparts.238
In all jurisdictions that will be touched upon below, the nature
of the judicial role and process makes courts a particularly
attractive forum for the implementation of the rights of nature.
Examining the broad guidance issued for judiciaries in
Commonwealth countries through the “Latimer House Principles”
illustrates these features of the judicial role and process.
Judiciaries should be made up of members of an independent legal
profession which presses for the entrenched independence of
courts, speaks out against administrative action and inaction, has
regard for its social responsibility, and avoids being an instrument
of party politics.239 Commonwealth judiciaries are to be
independent, impartial, honest, and competent.240 Inherent in this
judicial duty is the absence of perceived bias and neutrality in
decision-making by judges. Judges must act, and be seen to act,
without fear or favor. Courts must not act unreasonably,
arbitrarily, or capriciously, but based on evidence. Commonwealth
judiciaries are expected to fulfill their critical role in the promotion
of the rule of law, especially by exerting their independence.241
Judicial appointments, tenure, remuneration, and resourcing must
be tailored to this end.242 Commonwealth judges are exhorted to
adopt a generous and purposive approach to Bills of Rights.243 All
people should ideally have access to the courts to enforce their
fundamental rights,244 and justice should generally be open and
transparent.245 These factors are particularly important in novel
environmental
litigation
against
governments,
where
constitutional rights are involved, open proceedings can facilitate

237. Fuentes, supra note 232; Ramirez, supra note 232.
238. Angie Vega, A Brief Explanation of Colombia’s Legal System, ANIMAL LEGAL & HIST.
CTR. MICHIGAN STATE UNIV. (2018), https://www.animallaw.info/article/brief-explanationcolombia%E2%80%99s-legal-system [https://perma.cc/S4NZ-NXSZ] (last visited Oct. 7,
2021).
239. Latimer House Principles, supra note 226.
240. Id. at 11.
241. Id. at 10.
242. Id. at 17-18.
243. Id. at 17.
244. Id. at 11.
245. Id.
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accountability and transparency, and the plaintiffs may be
marginalized or indirectly interested parties.
In both Ecuador and Colombia, the principle of judicial
independence is a crucial component of the constitutional order,
which is based on the adoption of a “rigorous Montesquieuan
principle of separation of powers.”246 While there may be
arguments about the extent to which judicial independence in
those jurisdictions has been observed in practice, these principles
persist.247 The judicial process is also informed by the principles of
rationality, due process, due diligence, efficiency, and justice,248
although once again the degree to which these principles are
followed is unclear.249
1. Rights of Nature Litigation
Landmark cases in common and civil law jurisdictions,
including Ecuador, Colombia, India, and Bangladesh, have
recognized and enforced the rights of nature. The rights of river
ecosystems have been central to these cases, reflecting the
environmental, cultural, social, and economic importance of these
systems and the urgency of their protection. As examined below,
the cases in which the courts upheld the rights of nature applied
domestic constitutional provisions which provide express
protection for such rights (see Section C of this article), or implied
rights by recourse to the canons of interpretation. While there is a
growing trend of courts finding implied rights of nature, this
recognition faces a unique set of obstacles, including that lower
court decisions are vulnerable to appeal, court-conferred rights of
nature may erode the perceived legitimacy of the judiciary, and
due to the difficulties with enforcement of remedial orders. The
246. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR Oct. 20, 2008, arts. 11(3), 167-70,
172-88; THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF COLOMBIA OF 1991, arts. 29, 228-33, 241-45; Sáez
Garcia, supra note 235, at 1287.
247. Sáez Garcia, supra note 235, at 1288, 1297.
248. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR Oct. 20, 2008, arts. 11(3), 167-70,
172-88; THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF COLOMBIA OF 1991, at arts. 29, 228-33, 241-45;
Fuentes, supra note 232; Ramirez, supra note 232; Sáez Garcia, supra note 235, at 1296;
Burgenthal et al., Ecuador: Legal and Judicial Sector Assessment, LEGAL VICE PRESIDENCY
WORLD
BANK
23
(Dec.
2000),
https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/zh/103461468751811623/pdf/269170Ec
uador0Legal0Assessment0SCODE09.pdf [https://perma.cc/UAL3-N7L9].
249. Sáez Garcia, supra note 235, at 1301-07.
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cases considered in the following Section illustrate these
challenges.
a. Protecting the Vilcabamba River – Ecuador
In 2010, two private citizens—Richard Wheeler and Eleanor
Huddle—brought the first case under the rights of nature
provisions enshrined in the Ecuadorian Constitution.250 The
plaintiffs brought an action on behalf of the Vilcabamba River
following the dumping of debris from road construction by the Loja
Provincial Government (“LPG”), which caused flooding and
damage to the river and the plaintiffs’ property. The plaintiffs
sought orders for restoration of the river and nearby affected
ecosystems. The respondent LPG, the Ministry of Environment, and
the Ombudsman’s Office were ultimately the subject of the Court’s
orders.251 The plaintiffs argued that the river’s constitutional rights
of nature had been violated by the LPG. The first instance judge
denied the river’s legal standing.252 On appeal, the Loja Provincial
Court of Justice held that the case could be brought under the
Ecuadorian Constitution’s broad rights of nature provisions,
thereby conferring standing on the plaintiffs to appear for the
river.253 The Provincial Court found in favor of the plaintiffs and
ordered the LPG to undertake restoration of the river in
accordance with measures to be specified by the Ministry of
Environment.254 The Provincial Court held that precautionary
measures must be implemented to prevent damage to the river.
The Provincial Court found, applying the “reverse” burden of proof
250. Richard Frederick Wheeler y Eleanor Geer Huddle c/ Gobierno Provincial de Loja,
juicio 11121-2011-0010 (Mar. 30, 2011) (Ecuador). No English translation of the
judgment is available. Kauffman & Martin, supra note 139; Sofía Suárez, Defending Nature:
Challenges and Obstacles in Defending the Rights of Nature Case Study of the Vilcabamba
River, ECUADORIAN ENV’T L. CTR., 3-4, 7 (2013).
251. Suárez, supra note 250, at 4.
252. Craig Kauffman & Pamela L. Martin, Testing Ecuador’s Rights of Nature: Why
Some Lawsuits Succeed and Others Fail, INT’L STUD. ASS’N ANN. CONF. at 6 (Mar. 18, 2016).
253. The highest court in Ecuador is the National Court of Justice, then the Provincial
Courts of Justice which have jurisdiction in each of the provinces. See CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR Oct. 20, 2008, Title III, Ch. 3; Title IV, Chap. 4. Lower courts and
tribunals sit below the Provincial Courts. Id. The Constitutional Court sits separately and
hears constitutional matters. Id. at Title IX, Ch. 2. Constitutional questions can also be
raised in lower and provincial courts. Id. For the nature of Ecuador’s constitutional rights
provisions, see supra Section B.
254. Suárez, supra note 250, at 7-8.
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in Article 397 in the Ecuadorian Constitution, that the plaintiffs did
not have to prove damage.255
The remedies granted were broad in scope. Road construction
was not prohibited, but the project was required to be carried out
in a way that respected the rights of nature and complied with
environmental rules and regulations.256 The judgment required
the LPG to issue an apology in a major newspaper. The Ministry of
Environment was ordered to conduct inspections to identify the
status of the river and the roadworks which had resulted in the
initial pollution. The LPG was required to prepare a plan for
remediation and rehabilitation.
Implementation of these wide-ranging remedies has,
however, proven problematic. A further inspection in 2012
identified that remediation work was still in a preliminary stage.
An action brought by the plaintiffs in the Constitutional Court in
2012 seeking enforcement of the Provincial Court’s orders was
dismissed.257 According to the plaintiffs, the progress of
remediation has been unsatisfactory.258 Ultimately, the plaintiffs
were forced to incur the remediation costs themselves.259
b. Protecting the Atrato River and the Amazon – Colombia
In 2016 the Constitutional Court of Colombia declared the
Atrato River a legal person with rights to protection, conservation,
maintenance, and restoration,260 inferring personhood from the
Colombian constitutional guarantees of biodiversity, cultural, and
humanitarian protection.261 The Atrato River case followed
decades of environmental degradation, which resulted both from
255. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR Oct. 20, 2008, art. 397 (in relation to
environmental damage “the burden of proof regarding the absence of potential or real
damage shall lie with the operators of the activity or the defendant”).
256. Suárez, supra note 250, at 7-8.
257. Id. at 9-10; Constitutional Court of Ecuador, Case no. 0032-12-IS, 2018 (Ecu.).
258. Id. at 10.
259. Lidia Cano Pecharroman, Rights of Nature: Rivers That Can Stand in Court, 7
RESOURCES 13, 9 (2018).
260. Ctr. for Soc. Just. Stud. et al. v. Presidency of the Republic (Constitutional Court
of Colombia, T-622/16, 10 November 2016) (Colom.) at 110.
261. THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF COLOMBIA OF 1991, arts. 78-82. For discussion, see
Craig Kauffman & Pamela Martin, How Courts are Developing River Rights Jurisprudence:
Comparing Guardianship in New Zealand, Colombia and India, 20 VT. J. ENV’T L. 260, 273-80
(2019) [Hereinafter Kauffman & Martin, How Courts are Developing River Rights
Jurisprudence].
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large-scale mining causing toxic chemicals to enter the river and
illegal logging which changed the flow of the river and caused
sedimentation.262 At first instance, the Administrative Tribunal of
Cudinamarca decided against protective action on the grounds that
the various government ministries named as respondents to the
motion were not duty bound to protect the river.263 That decision
was then appealed to the Constitutional Court.264
The Constitutional Court found in favor of the plaintiffs,
recognizing that the river had constitutional rights, infringements
of which could be heard by the Court. The panel of three judges led
by the Chief Judge relied on Article 215 of the Constitution which
allows the government to declare a state of emergency when there
is a grave threat to the ecological order of the country,265 inter alia,
also noting constitutional recognition of Indigenous and AfroColombian ethnic groups as a factor influencing the decision.266
Several aspects of reasoning in the case are noteworthy. The
judgment noted the spiritual importance of the river and
expounded on the ‘Ecological Constitution,’ or the set of normative
content composed of principles, fundamental rights, and
obligations that protect the environment and natural resources.267
The final decision was partly based on “biocultural” rights which
emphasize that the rights of people and nature are inextricably
linked.268 The Court defined biocultural rights as:
[T]he rights that ethnic communities have to administer and
exercise autonomous guardianship over their territories according to their own laws and customs - and the natural
resources that make up their habitat, where their culture, their
262. Ctr. for Soc. Just. Stud. et al. v. Presidency of the Republic (Constitutional Court
of Colombia, T-622/16, 10 November 2016) (Colom.) at 8, 10.
263. Id. at 14.
264. There are four “High Courts” in Columbia—the Constitutional Court
(constitutional jurisdiction), the Supreme Court (ordinary jurisdiction), the Council of
State (administrative jurisdiction), and the Superior Council of Judicature (disciplinary
jurisdiction). Below the High Courts, Superior Tribunals sit in each judicial district. Each
judicial district includes municipal and circuit courts. See THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF
COLOMBIA OF 1991, Art. 116, Title VIII; REPUBLIC OF COLUMBIA, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE,
SUPREME
COURT
OF
JUSTICE,
https://cortesuprema.gov.co/corte/wpcontent/uploads/2015/08/ORGANIGRAMACONFONDOPEQUENO.jpg.
265. Ctr. for Soc. Just. Stud. et al. v. Presidency of the Republic (Constitutional Court
of Colombia, T-622/16, 10 November 2016) (Colom.) at 109.
266. Id. at 54-55, 57, 102.
267. Id. at 32.
268. Id. at 35, 40, 102.
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traditions and their way of life are developed based on the
special relationship they have with the environment and
biodiversity.269

The decision also cited the need for sustainable
development,270 international legal precedents concerning
biocultural rights, the principle of the prevention of environmental
harm, and the precautionary principle.
The Constitutional Court ordered the creation of the
Commission of the Guardian of Atrato River, which included two
designated guardians from the Humboldt Institute and World
Wildlife Fund Colombia, two non-government organizations,
assisted by a panel of experts. Rights of nature were embedded
within a management governance body to be collectively
implemented by the guardian body together with government
bodies, other institutions, and community stakeholders.271 The
government was ordered to eradicate illegal mining in and around
the river and to create plans to restore subsistence farming along
the river, allowing for cleaner food sources. Epidemiological and
toxicology studies were also ordered.272
The Supreme Court of Justice of Colombia has also recognized
the Colombian portion of the Amazon river as the “subject of
rights” citing the Atrato River case.273 The plaintiff nongovernment organization representing a group of children and
young adults sought the protection of various rights such as the
right to life and health threatened by climate change by seeking
orders to control deforestation of the Colombian Amazon.274 The
Presidency of the Republic, the Ministry for the Environment, and
affected communities were ordered to prepare a short-, medium-,
and long-term action plan within four months to counteract the
rate of deforestation in the Colombian Amazon.275
269. Id. at 35.
270. Id. at 30-31, 35, 37, 51-52, 64, 66, 74, 97, 106.
271. Id. at 100-01, 110.
272. Id.
273. Future Generations v Ministry of Environment (2018) STC4360-2018 at 14.
Anastasia Moloney, Colombia’s top court orders government to protect Amazon forest in
landmark case, REUTERS (Apr. 7, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombiadeforestation-amazon/colombias-top-court-orders-government-to-protect-amazonforest-in-landmark-case-idUSKCN1HD21Y [https://perma.cc/S2V7-DCGT].
274. CYRUS. R. VANCE CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 24.
275. Id. at 25.
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It should be noted, however, that the enforcement of orders in
both cases concerning the Atrato River and Amazon Basin has been
difficult, taking many months or years.276
c. Protecting the Ganga and Yamuna rivers – India
India is a jurisdiction in which the courts at various levels, led
by the Supreme Court,277 have very actively recognized rights of
nature in the absence of an explicit constitutional or legislative
instrument enshrining such rights. This has been achieved through
provisions in the Constitution of India that recognize a right to
life,278 impose duties of environmental protection,279 and enable
public interest litigation in the Supreme Court.280 Indian courts
have heard many cases based on the constitutional right to life and
it is beyond the scope of this article to examine them all.281
In Mohd Salim v State of Uttarakhand (Salim), the High Court
of Uttarakhand conferred legal personhood status on the Ganga
and Yamuna rivers.282 The case was brought following decades of
government inaction to restore the heavily polluted sacred Ganga
and Yamuna Rivers.283 Mohammed Salim, a local resident, filed a
public interest lawsuit in 2014 to stop illegal mining and
construction and address pollution in the rivers. The final ruling
issued in 2017 ordered the Ganga and Yamuna rivers to be treated
as living human entities with all the ensuing rights of legal
276. Id.; Phillip Wesche, Rights of Nature in Practice: A Case Study on the Impacts of
the Colombian Atrato River Decision, 33 J. ENV’T L. 531 (2021).
277. The Supreme Court is the apical court in India and hears appeals from the High
Courts of the states and union territories. States and union territories are divided into
districts. Each district has a District Court and may have Sub-District Courts. See BHARATIVA
SAMVIDHANA [CONSTITUTION], Art. 124(1), 214 (India); MARY KOZLOVSKI, A BRIEF
INTRODUCTION TO THE INDIAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND COURT HIERARCHY (Melbourne University
Asian Law Centre 2019).
278. BHARATIVA SAMVIDHANA [CONSTITUTION], Art. 21 (India).
279. Id. arts. 48A, 51A(g).
280. Id. art. 32.
281. For example, in Centre for Environmental Law, WWF-I v. Union of India (2013)
8 SCC 234, the Supreme Court of India extended the application of the right to life
guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution to a group of endangered Asiatic Lions. In
Animal Welfare Board of India v. A. Nagaraja (2014) 7 SCC 547, 27, 28, the same Court held
that the right to life extended to non-human animals and found that statutory duties on
those in charge of animals to ensure their well-being conferred corresponding rights on
the animals.
282. Mohd. Salim v. State of Uttarakhand LNIND 2016 UTTAR 990 (India).
283. Id. at 1-4.
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personhood.284 The plaintiff, who sought removal of illegal
construction, did not seek this declaration of environmental
personhood.285 The judges took this step, noting that the dire
environmental situation of the Ganga and Yamuna rivers required
drastic measures.286 The decision was also justified by reliance on
domestic decisions in which juristic personhood had been granted
to Hindu idols representing deities which are able to sue to protect
their interests and spiritual role in society.287 The Court stated that
the Ganga and Yamuna rivers were similarly sacred.288 The Court
also cited the government’s failure to uphold Articles 48A and
51A(g) of the Constitution of India, which require the state and
society in general to protect and improve the environment, as
bases for the decision to grant personhood.289
The Court specified that certain government bodies and
officers were responsible to act for the protection of the rivers,
invoking the legal doctrine of in loco parentis (“in the place of a
parent”).290 This is notably different from the New Zealand
arrangements, where the ecosystems are considered legally
mature persons and their representative bodies are made up
partly of Indigenous peoples. The Court’s decision responded to
the failure of the government to act on previous orders requiring
the establishment of a Ganga Management Board and prohibiting
mining in the Ganga river bed and flood plain.291
Lalit Miglani v. State of Uttarakhand (Miglani) subsequently
extended the personhood status of the rivers to the surrounding
ecosystem, including glaciers, streams, and mountains.292 The
Court’s decision referred to the Te Awa Tupua Act.
In May 2019, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana adopted
similar arrangements, extending legal personality to the “entire
animal kingdom” within the state.293

284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

Id. at 18-20.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11-15
Id. at 16-17.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 1.
Lalit Miglani v. State of Uttarakhand LNIND 2016 UTTAR 885 (India).
Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana, 2019 SCC Online P&H 704 (India).
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On March 3, 2020 that Court declared the artificial Sukhna
lake to be a legal person with the indicia of a living person and
declared that all citizens of the city of Chandigarh stood in loco
parentis for that entity.294
Interestingly, the decisions of Indian courts have a broader
operation than the statutory approach to rights of nature in New
Zealand in a number of respects: they apply to a huge array of
natural objects and creatures; they impose strict liability on those
who are the subject of litigation;295 and in some cases they hold that
the protected environs are deemed living persons, not just artificial
legal ones, potentially giving them access to rights, duties, and
liabilities inaccessible to other non-human legal persons.296
The State of Uttarakhand appealed the 2017 High Court of
Uttarakhand’s decisions to the Supreme Court of India, seeking to
set aside the orders naming them as the guardians of the relevant
ecosystems. The High Court of Uttarakhand’s decisions have been
stayed.297 In the appeal of Salim the State of Uttarakhand
contended that despite the importance of the rivers, this alone was
not enough to justify a declaration that they are living entities.298
The State raised constitutional difficulties associated with the
management of interstate rivers under the institutional
arrangements mandated by the Court.299 The State further raised
the possibility of state liability in lawsuits against the river’s
guardians following flooding of the rivers that caused property
damage.300
294. Court on its own motion v. Chandigarh Admin., No. 18253 (High Court of PunjabHaryana, Mar. 2, 2020); Saurabh Malik, HC: Sukhna Lake of Chandigarh is Legal Entity, Raze
INDIA
(Mar.
3,
2020),
Buildings
in
Catchment
Area,
TRIBUNE
https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/hc-sukhna-lake-of-chandigarh-is-legal-entityraze-buildings-in-catchment-area-50017 [https://perma.cc/EV2F-QJDA].
295. Erin L. O’Donnell, At the Intersection of the Sacred and the Legal: Rights for
Nature in Uttarakhand, India, 30 J. ENV’T L. 135, 140 (2018).
296. Id. at 138.
297. See Uttarakhand v. Mohd. Salim., Special Leave to Appeal No. 016879 (Jul. 7,
2017) (stayed the ruling in Salim); see also Union of India v. Lalit Miglani, Special Leave
Petition (Civil) Diary No. 34250 (Nov. 27, 2017) (stayed the ruling in Miglani).
298. Amit Anand Choudhary, SC Stays Uttarakhand HC Order Declaring Ganga,
INDIA
(July
7,
2017)
Yamuna
as
Living
Entities,
TIMES
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/sc-stays-uttrakhand-hc-order-declaringganga-yamuna-as-living-entities/articleshow/59494002.cms [https://perma.cc/7MCCVHF9].
299. Id.
300. Id.
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d. Protecting the Turag River – Bangladesh
A non-government organization commenced action seeking a
directive from the Supreme Court of Bangladesh High Court
Division to evict substantial illegal encroachments on the Turag
River and halt further construction and in-filling.301 The action was
enabled under Article 102 of the Constitution of Bangladesh, which
allows citizens to enforce their fundamental human rights,
including the right to life.302 The case followed years of litigation,
including a similar petition in 2009 and an inquiry report by the
Chief Judicial magistrate.303 The High Court’s lengthy judgment
examined the application of the public trust doctrine, cited
relevant water protection statutes,304 cited Principle 15 of the Rio
Declaration as supporting a precautionary approach,305 declared
the river a legal person and a living entity,306 and relied upon cases
such as the Atrato River case in Colombia307 and Salim in India.308
The judgment also referred to the Te Awa Tupua Act.309
The decision declared that the Turag River and all rivers
flowing through Bangladesh were legal persons. The Court
declared the National River Conservation Commission the person
in loco parentis to all the rivers of Bangladesh and found that this
body was obligated to ensure their protection, conservation, and
freedom from pollution.310 The High Court Division declared that
illegal structures, encroachment, and pollution in the Turag River
should be removed at the expense of the encroachers inter alia.311
The decision was upheld in key respects by the Appellate

301. Human Rts. and Peace for Bangl. v. Gov’t of Bangl., No. 13989 [hereinafter Turag
River]. The authors have relied on an English translation of Writ Petition No 13989/2016
by Rebecca Peters from the University of Oxford and Mohammad Sarwar from the
University of Dhaka produced in 2019. Page references refer to the pages of the English
translation.
302. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH, arts. 31, 32.
303. Turag River, supra note 301, at 5-14.
304. Id. at 93-219.
305. Id. at 437.
306. Id. at 446.
307. Id. at 440-41.
308. Id. at 441-43.
309. Turag River, supra note 301, at 443-45.
310. Id. at 446-49.
311. Id. at 446-50.
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Division.312 As a result of the finding, authorities have evicted
people living along the banks of Bangladesh’s rivers.313
Several observations can be made about rights of nature
litigation based upon the above cases. These are provided below.
2. The Role of Appellate Courts and Court Hierarchies
Courts generally exist in a hierarchy and the apical court in a
regional or national system is the ultimate decider of an issue,
whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction. Where
landmark decisions are made at the highest court level the impact
on a legal system and society more broadly is likely to be
substantial.
The Vilcabamba River case in Ecuador and the Atrato River
case in Colombia highlight the need for litigants to pursue matters
on appeal when unsuccessful at the lower court level. On appeal to
higher courts in both cases the plaintiffs were successful.314 The
Indian Supreme Court, a national apical court, has led the
development of jurisprudence on the right to life in relation to
environmental issues.315 The same observation can be made about
the Pakistan Supreme Court.316

312. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court is the apical court in Bangladesh.
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to conduct constitutional interpretation and hear
appeals on various matters from inferior courts. There are a range of subordinate courts
and tribunals, including a specialist Environmental Court. See Nishat Jute Mills Ltd. v Hum.
Rts. and Peace for Bangladesh No. 3039 Supreme Court of Bangladesh 2019 (Feb. 17, 2020)
(Bangl.); see also Md. Ershadul Karim, UPDATE: The Legal System of the People’s Republic
of
Bangladesh,
N.Y.U.
(July/Aug.,
2018),
https://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Bangladesh1.html
[https://perma.cc/FS3R3JJ3] (last visited Oct. 7, 2021).
313. Rina Chandran, Fears of Evictions as Bangladesh Gives Rivers Legal Rights,
REUTERS (July 4, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bangladesh-landrightsrivers-idUSKCN1TZ1ZR [https://perma.cc/W79M-FZZV].
314. See Kauffman & Martin, Can Rights of Nature, supra note 136, at 136; see also
Rights of Rivers, supra note 13, at 22-23.
315. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
316. See Shelha Zia v. WAPDA, (1994) 693 PLD (SC) No.15-K (Pak.); Asghar Leghari
v. Fed’n Pak., (2018) PLD (Lahore) 364 (Pak.); Dr. Parvez Hassan, Environmental
Jurisprudence from Pakistan: Some Lessons for the SAARC Region, S. ASIA CONF. ON ENV’T JUST.
(Mar.
24-25,
2012,)
https://www.iucn.org/sites/dev/files/import/downloads/pk_1_environmental_jurispru
dence_from_pakistan___some_lessons_for_the_saarc_region__d.pdf
[https://perma.cc/73AX-9L2L].
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Conversely, decisions of lower courts are subject to being
overturned on appeal. For example, the Indian decisions of Salim317
and Miglani318 were stayed by the Uttarakhand Supreme Court
soon after they were handed down for reasons discussed above.319
The existence of a dispersed, independent federal court
structure in India may have contributed to the development of
nature’s rights in that country. When resolving controversies and
in circumstances of increasing local environmental degradation,
India’s federal structure allows intermediate judges to act where
they find federal legislation to be ineffective. However, the court
structure may also constitute a potential source of the frustration
of the rights of nature movement, as exemplified by the Supreme
Court’s stay of Salim and Miglani. The development of
environmental personhood is always peculiar to the jurisdiction
concerned. For example, developments in Uttarakhand should be
understood in the context of the serious environmental
degradation of the rivers and glaciers concerned, their religious
and symbolic importance for Hindus,320 Uttarakhand’s exceptional
biodiversity and forest cover,321 its position in the shadow of the
Himalayas (from which India’s great rivers flow),322 the massive
bushfire damage suffered in this region in 2016,323 and the legacy
317. Salim v. State of Uttarakhand LNIND 2016 UTTAR 990 (India).
318. Lalit Miglani v. State of Uttarakhand 2016 UTTAR 885 (India).
319. See Uttarakhand v. Mohd. Salim., Special Leave to Appeal No. 016879 (Jul. 7,
2017) (stayed the ruling in Salim); see also Union of India v. Lalit Miglani, Special Leave
Petition (Civil) Diary No. 34250 (Nov. 27, 2017) (stayed the ruling in Miglani).
320. See, e.g., Ashraf Jamal, Exploring the Land of Gods, Uttarakhand, CONNECTED TO
INDIA (Feb. 2 2019), https://www.connectedtoindia.com/exploring-the-land-of-godsuttarakhand-66.html [https://perma.cc/9RUH-5QZ3]; see also Salim v. State of
Uttarakhand LNIND 2016 UTTAR 990 (India) at 11, 17.
321. See, e.g., Mayank Aggerwal, Uttarakhand’s Draft Ecotourism Policy Could
(Aug.
21,
2020)
Threaten
Biodiversity,
MONGABAY
https://india.mongabay.com/2020/08/uttarakhands-draft-ecotourism-policy-couldthreaten-biodiversity/ [https://perma.cc/ZC2W-SN77]. See also Lalit Miglani v. State of
Uttarakhand 2016 UTTAR 885 (India) (containing a lengthy analysis of the type and value
of the Himalayan ecosystem).
322. D. Aithani et al., Water Quality of Himalayan Rivers in Uttarakhand, in WATER,
CRYOSPHERE, AND CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE HIMALAYAS (Ajay Kumar Taloor et al. eds., Springer
Cham 2021).
323. Seema Sharma, Forest Fire: What Uttarakhand’s Needs to Change, ECON. TIMES
(May 8, 2016), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/forestfire-what-uttarakhands-needs-to-change/articleshow/52172780.cms
[https://perma.cc/57WB-X37L]; see also Lalit Miglani v. State of Uttarakhand 2016 UTTAR
885 (India) (containing a section examining forest fires in the judgment).
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of local environmental movements including the Chipko
conservation movement.324 The Chipko movement was a forest
conservation movement that emerged in the 1970s in Uttarakhand
which successfully employed Gandhian methods of non-violent
protest.325
3. Developing a Global Jurisprudence
A striking aspect of the cases described above is how judges
from diverse countries across civil and common law legal systems
have drawn on similar international and domestic instruments,
cases, and legislation to undertake a comparative analysis of other
jurisdictions, effectively using them as precedent. This is
particularly important when a judge is being asked to consider an
issue for the first time and no precedent from within the domestic
legal system is likely to exist.
The willingness of the Colombian Constitutional Court in the
Atrato River case, the High Court of Uttarakhand in Salim and
Miglani, and the Supreme Court of Bangladesh in Turag River to
consider comparative cases and legislation such as the Te Awa
Tupua Act in New Zealand is critical to the judicial reasoning
process. While no New Zealand court has considered the
personhood legislation in that country to date, these statutory
rights have proved influential in the reasoning of judges in other
jurisdictions.
Well-established principles from international and domestic
environmental law, especially the precautionary principle—which
recommends making decisions that avoid harm where there is a
lack of scientific certainty about the potential extent of harm—are
cited in several of the cases considered above.326 The

324. R GUHA, THE UNQUIET WOODS: ECOLOGICAL CHANGE AND PEASANT RESISTANCE IN THE
HIMALAYA, (U.C. Press ed. 2000); see also Lalit Miglani v. State of Uttarakhand 2016 UTTAR
885 (India) (noting that the judgment refers approvingly to the goals and activities of the
Chipko movement).
325. Ramachandra Guha, A Common Thread, TELEGRAPH ONLINE (June 5, 2021),
https://www.telegraphindia.com/opinion/gandhians-north-and-south/cid/1817775
[https://perma.cc/4PH5-KQBE]; The Editorial Board, Life Lessons: Sunderlal Bahuguna,
TELEGRAPH ONLINE (May 26, 2021), https://www.telegraphindia.com/opinion/lifelessons-sunderlal-bahuguna/cid/1816777 [https://perma.cc/8STJ-3S8D].
326. See, e.g., Suárez, supra note 250, at 8; Lalit Miglani v. State of Uttarakhand 2016
UTTAR 885 (India); Ctr. for Soc. Just. Stud. et al. v. Presidency of the Republic
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precautionary principle is embodied in Principle 15 of the Rio
Declaration 1992. Courts have also deployed the emerging
principle of in dubio pro natura (that is, when in doubt, decide in
favor of nature).327 The latter principle is entrenched in the IUCN
World Declaration on the Environmental Rule of Law (2016).328
The cases referred to above have dealt with allegations of
overexploitation by development and encroachment. In this
context, sustainable development principles have been a guiding
focus.329 Sustainable development is a now well-established
concept. It can be defined as development that meets the needs of
the present without compromising the ability of future generations
to do so. In the Atrato River case, sustainable development played
a key role given the constitutional enshrinement of that principle
in Colombia.330 Interestingly, both Colombian and Indian courts
have recognized the tension inherent within the principles of
sustainable development. For example, the decision of Miglani
cited the works of Vikram Soni and Sanjay Parikh, who have
concluded that sustainable development is unworkable and a
“dangerous cliché.”331 The Constitutional Court of Colombia noted
that the principle involves the “difficult” reconciliation of economic
growth, social welfare, and the protection of the environment.332
However, that Court also noted that global solidarity on
environmental issues is based on the concept of sustainable
development.333 The High Court of Punjab and Haryana cited an
earlier Indian decision which stated that “the traditional concept
that development and ecology are opposed to each other, is no
longer acceptable. Sustainable Development is the answer.”334
(Constitutional Court of Colombia, T-622/16, 10 November 2016) (Colom.); Turag River,
supra note 301, at 434, 436, 447.
327. See, e.g., Ctr. for Soc. Just. Stud. et al. v. Presidency of the Republic (Constitutional
Court of Colombia, T-622/16, 10 November 2016) (Colom.), at 78.
328. World Declaration on the Environmental Rule of Law, Principle 5 (IUCN, 2016).
329. See, e.g., Ctr. for Soc. Just. Stud. et al. v. Presidency of the Republic, at 30-32, 3537, 51-53, 64, 65-66, 75-76, 97-98, 105-06; Lalit Miglani v. State of Uttarakhand 2016
UTTAR 885 (India).
330. Ctr. for Soc. Just. Stud. et al. v. Presidency of the Republic, at 51-52, 61-63;
CONSTITUTION OF COLOMBIA, art. 80.
331. Lalit Miglani v. State of Uttarakhand 2016 UTTAR 885 (India).
332. Ctr. for Soc. Just. Stud. et al. v. Presidency of the Republic, at 32.
333. Id. at 33.
334. Court on its own motion v. Chandigarh Admin., No. 18253 (High Court of PunjabHaryana, Mar. 2, 2020) (citing Vellore Citizens’ Welfare Forum v. Union of India, (1996) 5
SCC 647 (India)).
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This expansion of jurisprudence can be seen in other
environmental law cases. In DG Khan Cement Ltd v Government of
Punjab, the petitioner, an operator of a cement company, argued
that regional government controls preventing the expansion of
such activities in a defined area were unlawful.335 The two-judge
bench found that there were serious environmental threats to
underground water aquifers in the area.336 The judgment applied
the precautionary principle to find that the development should be
prohibited until a detailed hydrogeological study had been
prepared.337 The Court recognized the importance of protecting
the environment in its own right by conferring legal personhood
on it, rather than through recognition premised on human rights.
The Court did so with reference to the Ecuadorian Constitution and
New Zealand statutes, decisions handed down in Colombia, India,
and Bangladesh, and local governing ordinances in the United
States, which have all granted legal personhood to nature.338
The Court also invoked the principle of water justice, whereby
the state should exercise stewardship over all water resources.339
It also noted that notwithstanding scientific uncertainty and
complexity regarding the extent of the risk of serious or
irreversible harm to water, human health, or the environment,
judges should uphold or order the taking of the necessary
protective measures having regard to the best scientific evidence
available.
While not strictly precedential, novel developments in one
jurisdiction are influencing other jurisdictions and being used as
an aid in curial decision-making. The successful implementation of
the rights of nature in one legal system may therefore influence
developments elsewhere, providing a basis for a global
jurisprudence to develop further in this area.
The diverse jurisprudence from around the world on the
rights of nature reflects a global movement, however each ruling
“emanates from local communities’ struggles” and “interpret[s]
335. DG Khan Cement Ltd. v. Gov’t of Punjab, C.P. 1290-L 2 (2021) (Pak.).
336. Id. at 16.
337. Id. at 16-17.
338. Id. at 12.
339. Id. at 13; see An Urgent Call for Decisive Action on Water, 2020 8th World Water
Forum, Mar. 20, 2018, http://8.worldwaterforum.org/en/news/ministerial-declarationseeking-decisive-action-water [https://perma.cc/6AXS-P6F3].
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emerging global norms within the context of domestic law and
culture.”340
4. Rising to the Substantive and Procedural Challenges
Several substantive and procedural issues may arise for
judges when adjudicating matters where the environment has
been granted rights. Threshold issues for litigation where novel
issues arise include jurisdiction, justiciability, and standing to sue.
Procedural issues during a trial include evidential requirements,
fact finding, and the application of the onus of proof.
a. Jurisdiction and Justiciability
A fundamental question is whether a court has jurisdiction to
hear a particular matter. A related but separate question is
justiciability. Jurisdiction concerns whether the court in question
is empowered by law to hear the matter, whereas justiciability
concerns whether the question is “susceptible to being the subject
of legal norms or of adjudication by a court of law.”341
Jurisdiction in this strict sense was not an issue in the cases
considered in Section D.1 above. Interestingly, in Miglani, the Court
noted that in matters of grave importance, it was not bound by
procedural technicalities, and cited a 1989 decision of the Supreme
Court of India holding that jurisdiction should not be declined on
the basis that an Act already deals with the subject matter.342
Justiciability was also not an issue in the cases considered
above. This is not to say, however, that the issue may not arise in
environmental personhood or rights of nature litigation. This is
particularly the case where plaintiffs invoke rights of nature
arguments in jurisdictions where those rights are not entrenched
and where there is an absence of explicit constitutional
environmental protections. For example, in Colorado River
Ecosystem v. Colorado, the plaintiffs attempted to have the Court
confer environmental personhood on the Colorado River and to
340. Kauffman & Martin, How Courts are Developing River Rights Jurisprudence, supra
note 261, at 265.
341. Ariel L. Bendor, Are There Any Limits to Justiciability? The Jurisprudential and
Constitutional Controversy In Light Of The Israeli and American Experience, 7 IND. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 311, 312 (1997).
342. Lalit Miglani v. State of Uttarakhand 2016 UTTAR 885 (India).
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obtain redress for violations of the River’s constitutional rights.343
The plaintiffs ultimately abandoned their case, submitting in their
own motion to dismiss that "the expansion of rights is a difficult
and legally complex matter. When engaged in an effort of first
impression, the undersigned has a heightened ethical duty to
continuously ensure that conditions are appropriate for our
judicial institution to best consider the merits of a new canon".344
Although the full reasons behind the plaintiffs' abandonment
of their case are unknown, one could infer that the plaintiffs may
have considered their pleadings insufficient to achieve a successful
outcome based on their comments reproduced above and reports
that the State Attorney-General threatened to apply sanctions to
the plaintiffs' lawyers for commencing frivolous proceedings.345
The Defendants' motion to dismiss argued that the complaint
“presents a nonjusticiable issue of public policy. Whether the
ecosystem should have the same rights as people, and who should
be allowed to assert those rights in federal courts, are matters
reserved to Congress by the Constitution.”346
Jurisdiction and justiciability affect the accessibility of the
courts to civil society. Notably, in the cases described above, higher
courts have embraced jurisdiction and justiciability to determine
the matter in issue.
b. Standing to Sue
A requirement for the initiating party in litigation to show that
they have an interest in the matter which is capable of establishing
343. Unopposed Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint with Prejudice, Colorado
River Ecosystem v. Colo., No. 1:17-cv-02316-NYW (D. Colo. Dec. 3, 2017)
http://climatecasechart.com/climate-change-litigation/wpcontent/uploads/sites/16/case-documents/2017/20171204_docket-117-cv02316_order.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CRX-E2DC]; Matthew Miller, Environmental
Personhood and Standing for Nature: Examining the Colorado River case, 17 U.N.H. L. REV.
355 (2019).
344. Unopposed Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint with Prejudice, Colorado
River Ecosystem v. Colo., No. 1:17-cv-02316-NYW (D. Colo. Dec. 3, 2017).
345. Chris Walker, Attorney to Withdraw Colorado River Lawsuit Under Threat of
Sanctions, WESTWORD (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.westword.com/news/colorado-riverlawsuit-to-be-withdrawn-due-to-potential-sanctions-9746311 [https://perma.cc/HY9VX6LS].
346. See Miller, supra note 343, at 372; Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Amended
Complaint, Colorado River Ecosystem v. Colo., No. 1:17-cv-02316-NYW at 2 (D. Colo. Dec.
1, 2017).
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standing to sue in a court is a feature of many legal systems.
Whether a plaintiff has standing to sue determines what interest
can be represented in court. As identified in Section B above,
standing can accommodate or hinder rights of nature cases.
A question that can arise in cases that have nature entities as
parties in the litigation is whether it or an individual or group
acting on its behalf has standing. For example, does the enabling
law, such as a constitutional provision, provide for representation
of rights of nature expressly in legal proceedings or must the ability
to do so be granted by a court exercising its discretion? Can any
organization interested in protecting an ecosystem petition a court
to do so, or must the petitioner be in a particular relationship with,
or have some proximity to, the ecosystem?
Generally, the issue of standing has not proven to be an
impediment in the cases discussed in Section D.1. The constitutions
of India and Bangladesh contain provisions which enable public
interest cases to be brought, meaning that standing is not in
issue.347
In the Atrato River case, the court recognized that nature
could be represented by individual plaintiffs.348 Article 241 of the
Constitution of Colombia confers standing on any citizen to enforce
constitutionally entrenched rights.349
Given that Ecuador lacks a developed constitutional or
statutory regime with respect to standing, the operation of any
standing requirements in actions to enforce constitutional rights of
nature was unclear after the enactment of the Ecuadorian
Constitution.350 However, in the Vilcabamba River case, the
relevant constitutional provisions were interpreted to confer
standing on anyone to enforce the rights granted to nature under
the Constitution.351 In at least one other rights of nature case in
Ecuador, standing was a live issue. In the 2014 Tangabana case, the
Judicial Court of Colta ruled against the claimants, partly on the
grounds that they could not prove that they themselves were

347. See CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, Art. 32; CONSTITUTION OF BANGLADESH, art. 102.
348. Ctr. for Soc. Just. Stud. et al. v. Presidency of the Republic at 110-13.
349. See Angel R. Oquendo, The Solitude of Latin America: The Struggle for Rights
South of the Border, 43 TEX. INT’L L.J. 185, 218 (2008).
350. Whittenmore, supra note 176, at 666.
351. Akchurin, supra note 199, at 942.
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harmed.352 Kauffman and Martin argue that this case
demonstrated a lack of understanding by the primary judge of the
open standing to enforce rights of nature created by Article 71 of
the Constitution.353 The decision was appealed to the Provincial
Court of Chimborazo but the appellate judge would not consider
new evidence and the appeal was dismissed.354 An appeal was filed
in the Constitutional Court in September 2015, but the Court
declined to hear the case, meaning the lower court decision
stands.355
Conferral of personhood can reduce the difficulty of meeting
standing requirements in environmental litigation. The result of
the decisions considered above in Section D.1 is that in future
litigation involving those relevant ecosystems, guardian entities
previously instituted by courts will have no issue with proving
standing in relation to enforcing rights of the natural entities.
c. Getting the Right Parties and Issues Before the Court
The courts in some of the cases considered above have been
prepared to have a wide range of parties represented before them.
In several cases, different departments and levels of governments
participated and were the subject of wide-ranging orders,
including in the Atrato River decision, the Salim and Miglani
decisions, and the Turag River decision.
Amicus briefs filed by individuals or organizations not party
to the proceedings who have an interest in the proceedings play an
important role in novel litigation. These briefs inform courts of
relevant facts and issues and provide a mechanism by which civil
society can present arguments to the court. Amicus briefs played a
role in several of the rights of nature cases considered above.356
Notably, in the Atrato River case, the amicus parties were
referenced in the remedial orders made.357

352. Kauffman & Martin, Can Rights of Nature, supra note 136, at 135.
353. Id. at 135-36.
354. Id.
355. Craig Kauffman & Pamela Martin, The Politics of Rights of Nature: Strategies for
Building a More Sustainable Future, MIT PRESS, 94 (2021).
356. See, e.g., Ctr. for Soc. Just. Stud. et al. v. Presidency of the Republic; Court on its
own motion v. Chandigarh Admin., No. 18253 (High Court of Punjab-Haryana, Mar. 2, 2020);
Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana, 2019 SCC Online P&H 704 (India).
357. Ctr. for Soc. Just. Stud. et al. v. Presidency of the Republic, at 110.
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d. The Onus and Standard of Proof
The issue of who bears the onus of proof in a particular case
is of fundamental importance to a court. Broadly, a plaintiff seeking
relief must prove their civil case. In Ecuador, the Constitution
reverses that onus of proof, placing the onus on the party seeking
to undertake development to demonstrate that no harm will be
caused by that development.358
In civil cases in the common law world, including India and
Bangladesh, the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities.359
In some civil law jurisdictions, including Ecuador and Colombia,
the standard of proof is not fixed by general rules but varies
depending on jurisdiction and area of law.360
e. The Factual Matrix
The factual matrix of a case is generally significant for
determining preliminary procedural issues and ultimately
whether relief will be granted. Where there is actual
environmental harm, discharging the burden of proving harm or
the potential for harm is likely to be straightforward. Where the
risk of future harm is uncertain or difficult to measure, the
application of the precautionary principle has proven of assistance
to plaintiffs. In many of the cases examined above, the
precautionary principle was employed as a guiding principle in
determining whether relief should be granted and the scope of that
relief.361
In successful cases, expert evidence concerning the state of
environmental degradation in issue will be adduced. In common
law countries, where experts are relied upon by the parties in
358. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR Oct. 20, 2008, art. 397.
359. ANUPAMA HEBBAR ET AL., LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT IN INDIA: OVERVIEW, Country
Q & A, Thomson Reuters Practical Law Westlaw UK (database updated Apr. 2021); Judicial
&
JURISTS
FOUND,
Proceedings
in
Bangladesh,
LAWYERS
https://www.lawyersnjurists.com/article/judicial-proceedings-bangladesh/
[https://perma.cc/948V-PBLL] (last visited Oct. 7, 2021).
360. E.g. there is no general standard of proof in Ecuador or Colombia. See JORGE
SICOURET LYNCH & MARCOS MIRANDA BURGOS, CORONEL & PEREZ, ABOGADOS, LITIGATION AND
ENFORCEMENT IN ECUADOR: OVERVIEW, Country Q & A, Thomson Reuters Practical Law
Westlaw UK (database updated November 2015); DAVID ARAQUE ET AL., LITIGATION AND
ENFORCEMENT IN COLOMBIA: OVERVIEW, Country Q & A, Thomson Reuters Practical Law
Westlaw UK (database updated May 2021).
361. See supra Section D.3.
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adversarial litigation, the calling of expert evidence by both parties
may result in contested expert evidence which a court must
evaluate. The United Nations Environment Programme has
extensively discussed the need for judges with expertise in
environmental issues to enable informed decision-making.362 In
civil law countries where experts are generally appointed by a
court, judicial expertise is also very important when analyzing
evidence, and especially in a context where the judge can actively
initiate the introduction or disclosure of relevant evidence.363
In the authors’ opinion, the evidence in cases considered
above in Section D.1 identifying the existing environmental
damage to the river system in question has generally been
overwhelming and supportive of judicial intervention.
Consequently, establishing the factual matrix has not proved a
hurdle in those cases.
5. Remedies and Limits of the Judicial Role
After finding a cause of action, the court must turn to the
threshold question of whether it can grant an effective relief or
remedy.
In the authors’ opinion, all the river protection cases gave rise
to wide-ranging remedies that judges were prepared to impose on
numerous government entities and, occasionally, civil society
groups such as non-government organizations, with consequential
substantial social and economic effects.
The decisions of Salim and Miglani have been criticized for
undermining Indian environmental protection legislation that
confers broad standing rights since it is unlikely that government
bureaucrats, particularly without the allocation of additional
funding for the cause, are best placed to advocate for the rights of
India’s rivers.364 The State of Uttarakhand, officials of which were
appointed as the guardians of the Ganga and Yamuna rivers,

362. U.N. Env’t Programme, Environmental Rule of Law: First Global Report, 114 (Jan.
24, 2019) (citing George Pring & Catherine Pring, Environmental Courts and Tribunals: A
Guide
for
Policy
Makers,
UNEP
(2016),
https://www.ajne.org/sites/default/files/resource/publications/7182/unep-ectsguide.pdf [https://perma.cc/G44R-AUUJ]).
363. Pejovic, supra note 233, at 331, 335.
364. Jha & Ghosh, supra note 9, at 501, 504.
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appealed the decision because of its unworkable implications.365
The content and scope of the duties to “uphold the status” and
“promote the health and wellbeing” of those ecosystems imposed
upon their representatives were unclear, raising difficult
questions, including with respect to retroactive liability, oversight
and review, and the degree of discretion conferred on the
government officials appointed as guardians of those entities.366
Additionally, to the extent that the principle of in locus parentis
implies responsibility for the actions of the minor, the decisions
raise a question as to whether the appointed guardians may be
exposed to liability for natural disasters such as flooding. This was
a ground of appeal in Salim.367 Issues of workability are arguably
exacerbated by the imposition of a strict liability standard; the
Court in Miglani declared that:
[A]ny person causing any injury and harm, intentionally or
unintentionally to the Himalayas, Glaciers, rivers, streams,
rivulets, lakes, air, meadows, dales, jungles and forests is liable
to be proceeded against under the common law, penal laws,
environmental laws and other statutory enactments
governing the field.368

Another issue, and a further ground of appeal in the Salim
case, was the jurisdictional extent of responsibility, given that the
relevant ecosystems extend beyond the borders of Uttarakhand.369
Jha and Ghosh doubt the efficacy of Salim and Miglani and argue
that the health of India’s rivers would be best achieved by
prioritizing the remediation of pollutant hotspots, frequent water
quality testing, a focus on institutional accountability, and
interstate cooperation to ensure the consistency of approach in
different states.370
Court-ordered personhood may also result in unforeseen
social consequences. As a result of the Turag River case, authorities
365. See discussion supra Section D.1.
366. O’Donnell, supra note 295, at 142; Madeleine Lovelle, Entering Unchartered
Waters: Awarding Legal Rights to Rivers, FUTURE DIRECTIONS INT’L (Sep. 2018),
http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/entering-unchartered-watersawarding-legal-rights-to-rivers/ [https://perma.cc/8VJQ-6BCY].
367. O’Donnell, supra note 295, at 142; see also discussion supra Section D.1.
368. O’Donnell, supra note 295, at 140; Lalit Miglani v. State of Uttarakhand 2016
UTTAR 885 (India).
369. O’Donnell, supra note 295, at 142.
370. Jha & Ghosh, supra note 9, at 511-12.
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have evicted people living along the banks of Bangladesh’s
rivers.371 This has resulted in extensive homelessness of those
living in densely populated slums along the banks of those
rivers.372 The consequences of this decision are an apt illustration
of Hope Babcock’s concern that judicially conferred personhood
carries a danger that political matters will be transferred to the
judicial branch.373 If courts do decide rights of nature cases with
inevitable public policy implications, and craft extensive remedies
affecting multiple entities, they are unavoidably entering into
politically contentious terrain.
The court orders in the Vilcabamba River case, which focused
extensively on remediation in the context of one development, a
substantial road, included orders that the relevant Ministry was
required to undertake inspections, prepare a report identifying
remedies, and monitor implementation of remedial works. The
Court ordered an apology in a major newspaper. However, as
discussed above, enforcement and implementation of those orders
proved problematic and the plaintiffs were ultimately forced to
fund remediation themselves.374 As examined above, similar issues
with implementation have occurred in relation to the
comprehensive orders in the Atrato River case, with compliance
delayed by several months.375
Plainly, difficulties arise in enforcing orders where courts
unilaterally develop institutions and expensive measures
considered necessary to sustain the health of ecosystems. Courts
that craft remedies which aim to manage ecosystems, establish
complex governance structures, and balance government and civil
society participation may push against the legal limits of the
judicial role.
6.

Judicial Overreach

Some scholars identify the legitimacy of a judiciary as a major
issue. Courts are described as unelected, relatively insulated from
accountability compared to elected representatives, potentially
371. Chandran, supra note 313.
372. Id.
373. Babcock, supra note 45, at 4.
374. Pecharroman, supra note 258.
375. Paola Villavicencio Calzadilla, A Paradigm Shift in Courts’ View on Nature: The
Atrato River and Amazon Basin Cases in Colombia 15 L. & DEV. J., 58 (2019).
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counter-majoritarian, and as being able to decide politically
contentious issues despite being composed of a small number of
people relative to legislatures.376 In scholarly examination of
judicial legitimacy, it has often been equated with ‘diffuse’ support,
meaning that the judiciary is the subject of a ‘reservoir’ of goodwill
irrespective of the outcome of a specific case.377 Issues of judicial
legitimacy may become especially pronounced where courts
fashion wide-ranging remedies and innovative doctrines.
The Indian judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, has long
held a reputation for judicial creativity with respect to
environmental issues.378 The Supreme Court has been provided
with opportunities to develop environmental law as a result of
extensive public interest litigation, which has been employed
strategically to circumvent the inaction of the legislature and
executive.379 The Supreme Court has, for example, declared that
the ancient doctrine of public trust, dating back at least to the
Institutes of Justinian, is part of the law of India.380 In Vellore
Citizen’s Welfare Forum, the Supreme Court imposed obligations on
a range of actors in Indian society to prevent and confront the
causes of environmental degradation, and placed the onus on
actors to demonstrate that their actions are environmentally
benign.381 Perhaps the willingness to innovate stems from the
importance attributed to environmental protection by the
Constitution of India, which imposes a fundamental duty on every
citizen of India to “protect and improve the natural environments
including forests, lakes, rivers and wild life, and to have
376. Shiri Krebs et al., What Determines the Institutional Legitimacy of the High Court
of Australia?, 43 MELB. UNIV. L. REV. 605, 605 (2020); Brandon L. Bartels & Christopher D.
Johnston, On the Ideological Foundations of Supreme Court Legitimacy in the American
Public, 57 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 184, 184 (2013); Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The
Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 635 (1992); see
generally DAVID EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE (New York, John Wiley 1965).
377. Id.
378. See, e.g., Shalini Iyengar et al., Selectively Assertive: Interventions of India’s
Supreme Court to Enforce Environmental Laws, SUSTAINABILITY, Dec. 2019, at 1, 2; VG Shinde,
Expanding Horizons Of Environmental Jurisprudence: A Judicial Creativity In India, 3 INT’L J.
OF ADVANCED RESEARCH & DEV 1, 2 (2018); Geetanjoy Sahu, Implications of Indian Supreme
Court’s Innovations for Environmental Jurisprudence, 4 L. ENV’T & DEV. J. 1, 3-4 (2008).
379. Sahu, supra note 378, at 3.
380. M. C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (1997) 1 SCC 388 (India); see also Bruce W. Frier, The
Roman Origins of the Public Trust Doctrine, 32 J. ROMAN ARCHAEOLOGY 641 (2019).
381. Vellore Citizens’ Welfare Forum v. Union of India, (1996) 5 SCC 647 (India);
Sahu, supra note 378, at 10-11.
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compassion for living creatures.”382 Miglani and Salim, which have
continued this practice of creativity in the Indian judiciary, have
both been embraced by scholars and critiqued for what has been
labelled as judicial overreach,383 or a “drift into policy making.”384
The development of environmental personhood is novel. In
any given case, a balance must be struck between “neither wholly
mechanical nor excessively creative” judging in which “creative
bursts” can legitimately occur.385 That a court extends the benefit
of constitutional rights to new subjects or expands the operation of
an existing doctrine does not render its decision outside orthodox
modes of legal reasoning.
II. PERSONHOOD: SYMBOLIC GESTURE OR A POWERFUL TOOL FOR
CHANGE?
Due to the nascent nature of environmental personhood
regimes and the paucity of evidence elucidating their efficacy, it is
difficult to answer the question of whether environmental
personhood can protect the environment.386
Environmental personhood may overcome the difficulties
that have historically burdened environmental protection
litigation, particularly with respect to justiciability and standing.
The wave of successful litigation in Ecuador relying on that state’s
constitutional rights of nature exemplifies how these rights may
substantially widen the scope of strategic climate change and
environmental protection litigation available in jurisdictions
where they are enacted.
Additionally, as the normative influence of those rights
increase, they are likely to result in improved environmental
outcomes in relevant ecosystems and contribute to a reimagining
of the relationship between humans and the natural world. As
Gordon writes: “[T]he legal structure underlying the personhood
changes give them actual heft, and can change the way people think

382. CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. art. 51A(g).
383. Jha & Ghosh, supra note 9, at 504.
384. Athens, supra note 122, at 217.
385. Michael Kirby, Precedent Law, Practice and Trends in Australia, 28 AUSTL. BAR
REV. 243, 249, 253 (2007); see also MICHAEL KIRBY, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: AUTHORITY, PRINCIPLE
AND POLICY IN THE JUDICIAL METHOD (Sweet & Maxwell 2004).
386. Zartner, supra note 37, at 1; Takacs, supra note 20, at 601-02.
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about the rights of the environment in ways that really change the
law in ways that affect the real world.”387
Environmental personhood, however, is not a panacea for
environmental degradation.388 Good drafting, political will,
enforcement, and funding is necessary to ensure the efficacy of
environmental personhood frameworks. In jurisdictions where
rights of nature have been implemented, but these indicia are
inadequate or absent, conservation and (in the context of settlerstates) the interests of First Nations peoples, continue to be
subservient to economic development. Governments in those
jurisdictions may benefit from the outward appearance of
ecocentrism, all the while acting with a pro-development
agenda.389 Conversely, there are early indications that where
environmental personhood is implemented as the result of
extensive consultation with First Nations peoples, these
frameworks can enhance the agency of First Nations peoples with
respect to their custodial lands, as in the case of New Zealand’s Te
Urewera protected area.
The method by which rights are conferred on nature also has
a direct bearing on their efficacy. Rights conferred by way of
constitution or statute have the greatest legal and symbolic force
but are difficult to enact. Conversely, local government orders and
court decisions finding rights of nature are vulnerable to appeal.
Judicially implied rights of nature have proven problematic where
respondents have failed to comply with court orders or complied
with those orders late.390 Additionally, courts have been accused of
judicial activism and impermissibly engaging in policy creation391
where decisions conferring personhood have far-reaching social
and economic impacts.
The current status of environmental personhood in various
jurisdictions is unlikely to represent the apotheosis of the rights of
nature movement. In its 2019 Harmony with Nature Report, the
United Nations Secretary-General observed that: “Earth
jurisprudence can be seen as the fastest growing legal movement
of the twenty-first century. The most significant consequence of
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.

Gordon, supra note 93, at 87.
Good, supra note 46, at 42.
Calzadilla & Kotzé, Living in Harmony, supra note 50, at 415.
Calzadilla, supra note 375, at 58; Wesche, supra note 276.
Athens, supra note 122, at 217.
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acknowledging human interconnectedness and inextricability
from the rest of the world has been casting the non-human world
as a legal subject.”392
If this movement finds more widespread favor,
environmental personhood may result in a paradigm shift akin to
the advent of corporate personhood. Lord Sumption described that
concept “as a fiction, and in a sense it is. But the fiction is the whole
foundation of English company and insolvency law.”393 Whether
environmental personhood will have a similarly broad-reaching
impact is unclear. It remains to be seen whether “time and
conditions are finally such that we can use these ideas to protect
nature with the zeal with which we have protected corporate
power.”394
However, time is of the essence. A 2019 Global Assessment
Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services of the
Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and
Ecosystem Services warned that “transformative change” is
needed to save humanity and nature from the effects of rapid
biodiversity and ecosystem decline.395 In this context, it appears
increasingly urgent that the law adapt, radically if required, in
order to reverse, or at the very least decrease, the current course
of accelerating environmental destruction. While not without
limitations, environmental personhood is one such method by
which the law can answer that call.

392. U.N. Secretary-General, Harmony with Nature, 129, U.N. Doc. A/74/236 (July 26,
2019).
393. Prest v. Petrodel Resources Ltd., [2013] UKSC 34, [2013] 2 AC 415, [8] (appeal
taken from Eng.).
394. Gordon, supra note 93, at 70.
395. E.S. Brondizo et al., Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem
Services of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem
Services,
IPBES
(May
2019),
https://ipbes.net/global-assessment
[https://perma.cc/X7YL-3BB2]; Rights of Rivers, supra note 13, at 6; Harriet HardenDavies, Fran Humphries et al., Rights of Nature: Perspectives for Global Ocean Stewardship,
122 MARINE POL’Y 1, 1-9 (2020).
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